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This thesis consists of three essays in financial econometrics. In the first part of the
thesis, motivated by different applications of hedging methods in the literature, we
propose a general theoretical framework for hedging and pricing. First, we review
briefly different strands of literature on hedging which have been developed in various
fields such as finance, economics, operations research and mathematics, and then try
to come up with a tractable way for hedging and pricing in this paper. By introduc-
ing different market principles, we study conditions under which the hedging problem
has a solution and pricing is possible. We will conduct an in-depth theoretical anal-
ysis of hedging strategies with shortfall risks as well as the spectral risk measures,
in particular those associated with Choquet expected utility. We show that asym-
metric information results in incorrect risk assessment and pricing. In the second
part of the thesis, we will apply our results in the first part to construct an economic
risk hedge. We also introduce a general method to estimate the stochastic discount
factors associated with different risk measures and different financial models. The
third part of the thesis modifies the speculative storage model by embedding stag-
gered price features into the structural model of Deaton and Laroque (1996). In an
attempt to replicate the stylized facts of observed commodity price dynamics, we add
an additional source of intertemporal linkage to Deaton and Laroque (1996), namely
speculation in intermediate-good inventories. The introduction of this type of friction
into the model is motivated by its ability to increase price stickiness which gives rise
to an increased persistence in the first and higher conditional moments of commodity
iii
prices. By incorporating intermediate risk neutral speculators and a final bundler
with a staggered pricing rule in the spirit of Calvo (1983) into the storage model, we
are able to capture a high degree of serial correlation and conditional heteroskedas-
ticity, which are observed in actual data. The structural parameters of both Deaton
and Laroque (1996) and our modified models are estimated using actual prices for 8
agricultural commodities. Simulated data are then employed to assess the effects of
our staggered price approach on the time-series properties of commodity prices. Our
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Introduction
Asset pricing and hedging are two cornerstones of financial economics; seemingly two
different areas of research in the literature, in many cases so entangled that it is
impossible to distinguish one from the other. While pricing always seems to be a
necessary issue, according to the Modigliani and Miller Theorem, there is no need
for hedging in financial markets. This theorem holds in an efficient market, with a
market price process being the classical random walk, under certain conditions: there
is no tax, no bankruptcy costs, no agency costs and no asymmetric information. This
suggests that in the absence of each assumption, one has to hedge.
The theory of asset pricing has been developed extensively during past few decades,
from different aspects. The most elegant development of the theory of asset pricing
in the literature is based on a representative agent’s utility maximization problem
which gives rise to several interesting discussions in matching the stylized facts with
ones suggested by theory. On the other hand, there are theories which find their
root directly in finance literature such as factor models (e.g. Arbitrage Price The-
ory) or the dynamic hedging of Merton, Black and Scholes. The former literature
is based on behavioral principles of consumers whereas the latter literature is based
on market principles, such as the No Arbitrage assumption. In both cases however,
two important facts play a major role: first, both theories try to hedge a financial
position against potential risks, either the shocks in asset values, or shocks in news,
by manipulating a set of available strategies; second, in both theories the key factor
1
for pricing is the stochastic discount factor, which prices financial positions in a cor-
rect way. For a comprehensive discussion on both facts see Cochrane (2009). In this
work we develop a methodology which can be properly used for hedging and pricing,
including both key facts mentioned earlier. Indeed, motivated by the development
of risk measures, their relation to Choquet expected utility, and their application in
the literature of finance and financial economics, we model the financial practitioners
behavior by risk measures leading to an aggregate cost (or profit) minimization (max-
imization) problem in order to hedge and price. We will see how using the aggregate
cost (or profit), instead of just using the hedging cost (or portfolio profit), will lead
to a more consistent theory which can easily be laid down in the existing literature
of finance.
We are mainly motivated by a framework that has been introduced and developed
in Assa and Balba´s (2011), Balba´s, Balba´s, and Heras (2009), Balba´s, Balba´s, and
Garrido (2010) and Balba´s, Balba´s, and Mayoral (2009); we set up our framework by
modeling the behavior of a (representative) financial practitioner using risk measures.
The key player in this setting is no longer a consumer, but a financial practitioner
who minimizes the aggregate cost (or maximizes the profit). Our aim is to develop a
tractable, as well as a general framework, which is also based on strong financial and
economic principles. We use different strands of literature developed in the asset-
pricing, economic hedging and hedging for pricing, compromising a unique theory of
factor hedging.
The last decade has witnessed a surge in commodity prices and a widespread
financialization of commodity products. The upward movements and the increased
volatility of commodity prices has been largely attributed to strong demand by China
and other emerging markets, as well as massive capital flows into the commodity mar-
kets by institutional investors, portfolio managers and speculators. While the impor-
tance of commodity price movements for economic policy and investors’ sentiment
2
has generated a substantial research interest, the behavior and the determination of
commodity prices is not yet fully understood. The main objective of this work is to
develop a structural model of commodity price determination that reflects the em-
pirical properties (high persistence and conditional heteroskedasticity) of commodity
prices. In order to achieve this goal and to gain further understanding of the fun-
damental factors that drive observed behavior of commodity prices, we modify the
structure of the speculative storage model from one where prices adjust almost instan-
taneously to harvest shocks to a setup in which change slowly and infrequently. More
specifically, we depart from the assumption that market prices are determined in a
perfectly competitive environment and extend the basic speculative storage model
by explicitly introducing intermediate goods speculators with a staggered pricing
rule. One appealing aspect of this approach is its ability to mimic some important
characteristics of actual commodity prices such as high persistence and conditional
heteroskedasticity, which can be generated even in the absence of correlated harvest
shocks. Another advantage of our proposed approach is the possibility of conducting




Hedging and Pricing in Incomplete
Markets
1.1 Literature on Pricing and Hedging
The theory we develop in this chapter is inspired by various asset pricing models in
the literature. First, we use the idea of factor models to the extent that a financial
position is approximated by a possible portfolio, namely the mimicking portfolio.
Starting with asset pricing, there are numerous theories, including the original capital
asset pricing models (CAPM) of Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and Black (1972),
which have been used in measuring the relationship between an expected return on
a security and its risk. In inter-temporal models the same idea has been developed,
for example by Merton (1973), Long (1974), Rubinstein (1976), Breeden (1979),
and Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985), and the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) of
Ross (1976). These models, in principle, suggest a relation between expected return
and one or more measures of exposure to systematic risk. In CAPM, a security’s
systematic risk is measured by its beta with respect to a diversified stock index, see
Blume and Friend (1973), and Fama and MacBeth (1973). However, in the wake of
Roll (1977), who criticizes the early studies by notifying that they are tests of that
4
the stock index is mean-variance efficient, many began risk-return analysis. Among
these variants of APT, Roll and Ross (1980) use factor-analytic methods to estimate
multiple measures of systematic risk.
The other main feature of our theory is to find an appropriate (stochastic) discount
factor in order to price correctly a position. Initiated by Black and Scholes (1973)
and Merton (1973), the methodology of No Arbitrage (NA) pricing and its relation
to martingale measures have been studied in Harrison and Kreps (1979); relating the
existence of a correct stochastic discount factor, the No Arbitrage assumption and
perfect hedging. This was the beginning of the idea that pricing a derivative of an
underlying asset is nothing but a discounted weighted average of the derivative, dis-
counted by a correct stochastic discount factor suggested by the martingale theory. In
a different setting though, a stochastic discount factor is assumed to be a probability
measure that can correctly price the test assets. The No Arbitrage condition holds
in this setting if the probability measure is everywhere positive. Given that typically
the stochastic discount factor set is a large set, the No Arbitrage conditions was
replaced later by the No Good Deal (NGD) assumption, which was first introduced
in Cochrane and Saa-Requejo (2000) in order to incorporate the market efficiency
measure. In Cˇerny´ and Hodges (2002) the authors re-introduce the notion of Good
Deals as free and desirable financial positions. In Assa and Balba´s (2011) one can
find a set of equivalent conditions to NGD assumptions when the agents preferences
are modeled by coherent risk measures.
In addition to what has been studied in the literature on pricing, we consider the
process of pricing as a natural product of a hedging process: meaning, to price the
fully hedged part and to value the un-hedged part. The literature on hedging has been
extensively studied in recent years. Apart from corporate hedging1, there is a large
1It is worth mentioning that the corporate hedging is an area has been developed in last few
years, however, since this literature has little to do with pricing we will not focus our attention to
it, just to mention few work look at Mayers and Smith (1990a), Mayers and Smith (1990b), Tufano
(1996), Smith and Stulz (1985) and Jensen and Meckling (1976).
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literature on developing methods based on mean-variance utility for economic hedg-
ing. Breeden, Gibbons, and Litzenberger (1989) test the consumption-based CAPM
by using a portfolio which has maximum correlation with consumption growth. Vas-
salou (2003) constructs a mimicking portfolio to proxy news related to future GDP
growth to explain a cross-section of equity returns. Balduzzi and Kallal (1997) apply
smaller variance interval bounds of Hansen and Jagannathan (1991), using hedging
portfolios for various economic risk variables. Balduzzi and Robotti (2001) use the
minimum-variance kernel of Hansen and Jagannathan to estimate the economic risk
premiums. In all of these papers, the mimicking portfolios are constructed by means
of an ordinary least squares projection of the risk variables on a set of security re-
turns. In Goorbergh, Roon, and Werker (2003), however, a weighted least squares
projection, based on a utility function, yields the hedging on security returns.
Another line of research has been developed in mathematical finance, devoted to
hedging financial positions, mainly concerned with the pricing of contingent claims.
This literature is developed in different directions. One is based on replicating (or
closely replicating) financial positions. For instance, the super-hedging strategy of
El Karoui and Quenez (1995), is well studied in the literature; see Karatzas and
Shreve (1998). In a different direction the problem of hedging was studied in a
mean-variance framework. Mean-variance hedging was first formulated in Duffie and
Richardson (1991), while the first ground-breaking result was obtained in Schweizer
(1992). For further evidence of this literature see Fo¨llmer and Schweizer (1991),
Gourieroux, Laurent, and Pham (1998), Laurent and Pham (1999), Scha¨l (1994) and
Schweizer (1995). Hedging is analyzed by using other decision-making tools, risk
measures, in place of mean variance. Fo¨llmer and Leukert (2000) propose replicating
contingent claims by minimizing the probability of shortfalls. Similarly Nakano (2004)
and Rudloff (2007, 2009) study the problem of minimizing the risk of a shortfall when
the risk is measured by a general coherent or convex risk measure.
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Another line of research, which is mainly developed in the literature of operation
research, is based directly on the concepts of hedging and minimization of risk rather
than replication of contingent claims (see Assa and Balba´s (2011), Balba´s, Balba´s, and
Heras (2009), Balba´s, Balba´s, and Garrido (2010) and Balba´s, Balba´s, and Mayoral
(2009)). The main idea is that the financial practitioner minimizes the risk of his/her
global position, given the budget constraint on a set of manipulatable positions (a
set of accessible portfolios, for example). Assa and Balba´s (2011) characterize the
existence of a solution to the hedging problem, showing that a solution exists if and
only if there is no costless risk-free position (arbitrage opportunity or “Good Deal”).
1.2 Preliminaries and Analytical Setup
We start by introducing the main terminology and notation for hedging and pricing
financial or economic variables. We assume a finite probability space with a finite2
event space Ω = {ω1, . . . , ωn}. We denote the physical measure by P, and the associ-
ated expectation by E. To simplify the discussion, we assume that P(ωi) = 1/n for
all i = 1, . . . , n. Our theory is developed in a static setting and we only have time
0 and time T . Each random variable represents the random value on a variable at
time T . We denote by Rn the set of all variables. The duality relation is expressed
as (x, y) 7→ E(xy) , ∀x, y ∈ Rn. The risk measure and the pricing rule are expressed
in terms of time-zero value and are real numbers.
Let Y be a subset of Rn. In the subsequent discussion, we will assume that Y
possesses one or several properties from the following list:
S1. Normality if 0 ∈ Y ;
S2. Positive homogeneity if λY ⊆ Y , for all λ > 0;
2All of the results can be easily extended to a probability space with no atoms in an appropriate
space – for instance, L2(Ω).
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S3. Translation-invariance if R+ Y ⊆ Y 3;
S4. Sub-additivity if Y + Y ⊆ Y ;
S5. Convexity if λY + (1− λ)Y ⊆ Y .
1.2.1 Risk Measures
In what follows, we use risk measures to quantify the risk associated with the undi-
versifiable part of the market exposure.
A risk measure % is a mapping from a set D ⊆ Rn to the set of real numbers R
which maps each random variable in D to a real number representing its risk. Each
risk measure can have one or more of the following properties:
R1. %(0) = 0;
R2. %(λx) = λ%(x), for all λ > 0 and x ∈ D;
R3. %(x+ c) = %(x)− c, for all x ∈ D and c ∈ R;
R4. %(x) ≤ %(y), for all x, y ∈ D and x ≥ y;
R5. %(x+ y) ≤ %(x) + %(y), ∀x, y ∈ D;
R6. %(λx+ (1− λ)y) ≤ λ%(x) + (1− λ)%(y).
If % satisfies properties R1, R2, R3, R5 or R6, D has to possess properties S1, S2,
S3, S4, or S5, respectively. A risk measure is called an expectation bounded risk if it is
defined on Rn and satisfies properties R1, R2, R3 and R5 above. The mean-variance
risk measure defined as
MVδ(x) = δσ(x)− E(x),
where σ(x) is the standard deviation of x and δ is a positive number representing the
level of risk aversion, is an example of an expectation bounded risk.
3in the sequel R represents the set of all constant random variables {(c, ..., c) ∈ Rn|c ∈ R}.
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An expectation bounded risk is called a coherent risk measure if it also satisfies
property R4. Finally, a convex risk measure satisfies properties R1, R3, R4 and R6.
Coherent and convex risk measures are introduced by Artzner, Delbaen, Eber, and
Heath (1999) and Fo¨llmer and Schied (2002), respectively, while expectation bounded
risks are first defined in Rockafellar, Uryasev, and Zabarankin (2006).
One popular risk measure is the Value at Risk defined as
VaRα(x) = −qα(x) , ∀x ∈ Rn,
where qα(x) = inf {a ∈ R|P[x ≤ a] > α} denotes the α-th quantile of the distribution
of x. Note that VaRα is a decreasing risk measure which is neither a coherent risk
measure nor an expectation bounded risk. In contrast, the Conditional Value at Risk







is a coherent risk measure.






where u is a utility function and ν is a non-additive probability. The measure ν
distorts the probability of different events. The case of a concave ν corresponds to a
pessimistic way of weighting events by assigning larger weights to less favorable events
and smaller weights to more favorable ones. A convex ν has the opposite effect. In




equation (1.2), we obtain the coherent risk measure %να defined in (1.1).
We have the following result from Bassett, Koenker, and Kordas (2004) which
relates the notion of coherent risk measures to the Choquet expected utility.
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Theorem 1.2.1 Let % be a coherent risk measure. If % is distribution invariant
(i.e., %(x) = %(y) for any two random variables x, y ∈ Rn such that Fx = Fy) and
co-monotone additive, then it is pessimistic.
To further generalize the concept of a risk measure, consider the following family
of risk measures.
Definition A risk measure is a generalized spectral risk measure if and only if there
is a distribution ϕ : [0, 1]→ R+ such that
∫ 1
0





One can readily see that %ϕ is law invariant, i.e., if x and x
′ are identically
distributed, then we have %ϕ(x) = %ϕ(x
′). Indeed, it can be shown that all law-
invariant co-monotone additive coherent risk measures can be represented as (1.3);
see Kusuoka (2001). Note that, by a change of variables, the spectral risk mea-
sure (1.3) coincides with the Choquet utility (1.2) for a risk neutral agent, i.e, when
u(x) = x. Furthermore, equation (1.3) describes a family of risk measures which are




VaRβ(x)ϕ(β)dβ is robust if and only if the support of ϕ is away from zero
and one. For example, Value at Risk is a risk measure with this property.
An interesting fact about this type of risk measures is that it can be represented
as infimum of a family of coherent risk measures.
Theorem 1.2.2 If %ϕ(x) =
∫ 1
0




ϕ(s)ds = 1, then we have
%ϕ(x) = min{%(x)| for all coherent risk measure % such that % ≥ %ϕ}.
Proof See Appendix A.
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This theorem provides a motivation for introducing another family of risk mea-
sures, called the infimum risk measures, which includes all coherent as well as spectral
risk measures.
Definition Let D be a point-wise-closed set of risk measures on D. Then, the infi-





A pricing rule π is a mapping from X ⊆ Rn to the set of real numbers R which maps
each random variable in X to a real number representing its price. The pricing rule
can possess one or more of the following properties:
P1. π(0) = 0;
P2. π(λx) = λπ(x), for all λ > 0 and x ∈ X ;
P3. π(x+ c) = π(x) + c, for all x ∈ X and c ∈ R (cash-invariance);
P4. π(x) ≤ π(y), for all x, y ∈ X and x ≤ y;
P5. π(x+ y) ≤ π(x) + π(y), for all x, y ∈ X ;
P6. π(λx+ (1− λy)) ≤ λπ(x) + (1− λ)π(y).
If π satisfies properties P1, P2, P3, P5 or P6, X has to satisfy properties S1, S2,
S3, S4, or S5, respectively. A pricing rule is super-additive if π(x+ y) ≥ π(x) + π(y),
for all x, y ∈ X .
A pricing rule that satisfies properties P1, P2, P3, P4 and P5 is called a sub-linear





Indeed, this supremum exists and is a finite number because (i) min(x) ∈ {y ∈ X |y ≤
x} and (ii) for any x, y ∈ X such that y ≤ x, we have π(y) ≤ max(x). It can be
easily seen that π˜ is a sub-linear pricing rule on Rn.




where R is given by
R := {z ∈ Rn|E(zx) ≤ π˜(x), ∀x ∈ Rn}. (1.7)
Monotonicity implies that z ≥ 0, ∀z ∈ R and translation-invariance implies E(z) =
1, ∀z ∈ R. Therefore, R is a compact set.
In this paper, the set R represents the set of nonnegative stochastic discount
factors induced by π and
π(x) = π˜(x) = sup
z∈R
E(zx), ∀x ∈ X . (1.8)
Also, the condition z > 0 is equivalent to the no-arbitrage condition
π(x) ≤ 0 & x ≥ 0⇒ x = 0. (1.9)
Jouini and Kallal (1995a), Jouini and Kallal (1995b) and Jouini and Kallal (1999)
argue that for a wide range of market imperfections such as dynamic market incom-
pleteness, short selling costs and constraints, borrowing costs and constraints, and
proportional transaction costs, the pricing rule is sub-linear. Even though the set
of sub-linear pricing rules is quite large, it does not cover some practically relevant
12








where R is the set of martingale measures of the normalized price processes of traded
securities (see Jouini and Kallal (1995a) and Karatzas, Lehoczky, Shreve, and Xu
(1991)), are of particular interest (El Karoui and Quenez (1995)). In this case, the
bid price is a super-additive pricing rule which does not fulfill the sub-additivity
conditions of the sub-linear pricing rule. Furthermore, in insurance applications, the
pricing rules are not, in general, sub- or super-additive. As pointed out by Wang,
Young, and Panjer (1997), the price of an insurance risk has a Choquet integral
representation as in equation (1.2) or (1.3) with respect to a distorted probability.
For this reason, we introduce the family of infimum pricing rules that subsumes both
sub-linear and non-sub-linear pricing rules.
Definition LetM be a point-wise-closed set of pricing rules on X . Then, the infimum





To put the subsequent discussion in the proper context, assume that we have a set of
perfectly-hedged variables denoted by X , where all members of X are priced according
to the pricing rule π : X → R. As an example, consider the case when X is equal
to the set of all portfolios of given assets (x1, ...., xN), i.e., X = Span(x1, ..., xN) or
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X = Span(x1, ..., xN)+ if the short-selling is forbidden. A variable y is perfectly-
hedged if y ∈ X . In this particular example, y is perfectly-hedged if there is a
portfolio whose value is equal to y, i.e., there exist numbers a1, ..., aN such that
y = a1x1 + · · · + aNxN . If any variable y can be perfectly-hedged, we say that the
market is complete. Otherwise, if there is at least one variable y whose risk cannot
be diversified by the set of perfectly-hedged positions, the market is incomplete.
This prompts the need to introduce the mapping (risk measure) % from the set of
all variables D to real numbers which measures the risk generated by the part that
cannot be hedged.
We next introduce the idea of projection. Let us consider a financial position y
in an incomplete market which has to be hedged or priced. To achieve this, we find
a variable, among all perfectly-hedged variables in the set X , that mimics y most
closely. In other words, we want to project y on the set X . Assume for a moment
that we know this projection and denote it by x ∈ X . Hence, y can be decomposed
into two parts: a mimicking strategy (portfolio in our example) x which is perfectly-
hedged, and an unhedged part y − x which generates risk. The cost of the mimicking
strategy (or perfectly-hedged) part is given by π(x), and the risk generated by the
unhedged part, which cannot be diversified by any member of X , is measured by
%(x − y). The idea of projection is to minimize the aggregate cost of the hedging
given as π(x) + %(y − x). Therefore, one can state the problem as follows:
inf
x∈X
{π(x) + %(x− y)} . (1.13)
In this case, the market imperfections are reflected by the (non-linear) pricing rule
π and the risk measure % which capture the market frictions and the market incom-
pleteness, respectively.
Let us now look at this problem from a pricing point of view. Suppose that
a financial practitioner wants to price the position (contingent claim, for example)
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y. While the pricing of y in complete markets can utilize directly the no-arbitrage
approach, the pricing problem in incomplete markets is less straightforward as it
needs to incorporate the cost of the unhedged part. As discussed above, the cost of
forming the mimicking strategy x is given by π(x) and the unhedged risk associated
with the unhedged part of y is given by %(x − y). Then, the competitive price for
position y can be defined as
π%(x) = inf
x∈X
{π (x) + % (x− y)} . (1.14)
As we demonstrate below, if % is a coherent risk measure and π a sub-linear pricing
rule, π% satisfies all of the properties of a sub-linear pricing rule except for the nor-
mality condition. As a result, we need to ensure that the normality condition holds
for π% to be a proper pricing rule.
Potential applications of this framework include hedging and pricing contingent
claims, insurance underwriting, hedging of economic risk etc. It should be noted
that a similar approach to pricing is adopted in Fo¨llmer and Leukert (2000) and
Rudloff (2007, 2009) but it is based on minimizing shortfall risk instead of minimizing
aggregate cost as we do in this paper. In what follows, we refine the choice of pricing
rules and risk measures and analyze their theoretical properties.
1.3 Main Theoretical Results
In this section, we establish some market principles for general risk measures and
pricing rules. The results are stated for two different categories: first, for risk mea-
sures and pricing rules which satisfy properties R1–R4 and P1–P4 (including non-
sub-additive pricing rules and risk measures), and, second, for risk measures and
pricing rules that satisfy properties R1, R2, R3, R5 and P1, P2, P3, P5, respectively
(including non-monotone ones). Results for the second family make use of the dual
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representation of pricing rules and risk measures. We then study the conditions under
which an arbitrage opportunity is generated.
1.3.1 Market Principles
We start with the following result for π% defined in (1.14).
Proposition 1.3.1 Let
X% := {x ∈ Rn|π%(x) ∈ R}.
Then, the following statements hold:
1. π% and X% are positive homogeneous if % and π are.
2. π% and X% are translation-invariant if % and π are.
3. π% and X% are sub-additive if % and π are.
4. π% and X% are convex if % and π are.
Furthermore,
5. π% is monotone if % and π are.
Proof See Appendix A.
Note that Proposition 1.3.1 does not say anything about the first property of a
pricing rule which warrants some further explanation. It turns out that for the first
property of a pricing rule to hold, we need to guarantee that some conditions for X ,
% and π are satisfied. Below, we explicitly state these conditions as general pricing
principles that are valid regardless of the type of pricing or pricing rule.
Normality (N). π%(0) = 0.
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No Good Deal Assumption (NGD). There is no financial position x such that
%(x) < 0 , π(x) ≤ 0.
Consistency Principle (CP). For any member x ∈ X , π and π% are consistent,
i.e.,
π(x) = π%(x).
Compatibility (C). For a risk measure % and a pricing rule π, (1.13) has a finite
infimum.
The first principle simply recognizes that the price of zero is always zero. The
second principle states that any risk-free variable has a positive cost (see Cochrane
and Saa-Requejo (2000)). The third principle is a consistency condition between a
pricing rule π and π% over X . The last principle points out that the hedging problem
always yields a price.
1.3.2 Positive-Homogeneous and Monotone Risk and Pricing
Rules
Next, we discuss the equivalence of the market principles for a risk measure % and
pricing rule π which satisfy properties R1–R4 and P1–P4.
Theorem 1.3.2 Let us assume % and π satisfy properties R1–R4 and P1–P4. Then,
(CP )⇒ (N)⇔ (NGD)⇔ (C).
Moreover, if X is a vector space and π is super-additive, we also have
(N)⇒ (CP ).
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Proof See Appendix A.
The following corollary states the conditions under which π% is a pricing rule.
Corollary 1.3.3 Given the notation above, π% : X% → R is a pricing rule if and only
if (N) or (NGD) holds.
1.3.3 Positive-Homogeneous and Sub-Additive Risk and Pric-
ing Rules
In this section, we assume that the risk measure % and the pricing rule π satisfy
properties R1, R2, R3, R5 and P1, P2, P3, P5, respectively. In that case, we extend









π(x) x ∈ X
+∞ otherwise.
This extension allows us to use the dual representation of positive-homogeneous
convex functions. Duality theory and sub-gradient analysis prove useful since the risk
measures and pricing rules are usually not differentiable. First, we present conditions
under which arbitrage opportunities do not exist in terms of the dual sets. Then,
we characterize the solution to the hedging problem (1.13) and the pricing rule π% in
(1.14).
We start by introducing some additional notation. From the theory of convex risk





4For technical reasons, we use −z instead of z.
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where f ∗ : Rn → R ∪ {+∞} is the dual of f defined as
f ∗(z) = sup
x∈Rn
{E(−zx)− f(x)}.
It can be easily seen that for any positive-homogeneous function f, f ∗ is 0 on a
convex closed set, denoted by ∆f , and infinity otherwise. Therefore, the Fenchel-




As an example, for any coherent risk measure %, ∆% is a subset of the set of all prob-
ability measures, i.e., ∆% ⊆ {z ∈ Rn|z ≥ 0,
∑
zi = 1}, and, therefore, it is compact
(see Artzner, Delbaen, Eber, and Heath (1999)). In contrast, for any expectation
bounded risk %, ∆% ⊆ {z ∈ Rn|
∑
zi = 0} (Rockafellar, Uryasev, and Zabarankin
(2006)).
Now let us assume that, in general, % and π are positive-homogeneous and sub-
additive mappings. Since % and π are positive-homogeneous and sub-additive, and
because X and D are positive cones, their extensions are also positive-homogeneous
and sub-additive. Then, we have the representations
%¯(x) = sup
z∈∆%¯
E(−zx) , π¯(x) = sup
z∈Rπ¯
E(zx) , ∀x ∈ Rn, (1.15)
for closed convex sets ∆%¯ and Rπ¯.
In order to obtain the representations for %¯ and π¯, we need to introduce the dual-
polar of a scalar-cone of random payoffs. If A is a scalar-cone of a random payoff,
the dual-polar of the set A is given by
A⊥ := {z|E(zx) ≤ 0 ∀x ∈ A}.
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We then have the following proposition.
Proposition 1.3.4 For any function f(x) := sup
z∈∆f
E(zx), for some set ∆f , which is




Proof See Appendix A.
Proposition 1.3.4 has the important implication that any risk measure %(x) =
sup
z∈∆%
E(−zx) defined on D, and pricing rule π(x) := sup
z∈R




E(−zx), π¯(x) = sup
z∈Rπ¯
E(zx),
where ∆%¯ = ∆% −D⊥ and Rπ¯ = R+ X⊥.
The following theorem states the main theoretical result of the paper.
Theorem 1.3.5 Assume that the risk measure %D is defined as in (1.4) and the
pricing rule πM is defined as in (1.12). Then, the following statements are equivalent:
1. The hedging problem (1.13) is finite.
2. R%,π = (∆% −D⊥) ∩ (Rπ + X⊥) 6= ∅ , ∀% ∈ D, ∀π ∈M
Furthermore, if condition 3 holds for π and %, these statements are equivalent
to
3. There is no Good Deal in the market.









Proof See Appendix A.
In most cases, such as coherent risk measures and deviation measures of risk, the
risk measure % is defined on Rn meaning that D⊥ = {0}. We then have the following
corollary.
Corollary 1.3.6 If % is a coherent risk measure and π a sub-linear pricing rule, then
there is no Good Deal if and only if Rπ% := ∆% ∩ (Rπ + X⊥) 6= ∅, and the pricing




Theorem 1.3.5 and Corollary 1.3.6 illustrate the generality of our approach com-
pared to the existing literature. In the existing literature, the set of stochastic
discount factors is constructed either parametrically (using, for example, a semi-
martingale process), or empirically and a pricing rule π is then obtained by taking
supremum of prices over a closed convex subset R. In order to price all positions in
the market, any stochastic discount factor z′ is constructed as a positive and linear
extension of z ∈ Rπ, i.e., z′|X = z. Therefore, the set of stochastic discount factors
is induced by the unique monotonic extension π˜ of π (for more details, see Theorem
2.1 in Jouini and Kallal (1995b)). By contrast, in our approach, the extension of the
pricing rule is not constructed monotonically but it is obtained within the hedging
problem and is affected, in general, by two additional factors: market incompleteness
and frictions. In our approach, assuming that % is defined on the whole space so that
D⊥ = {0}, the set of stochastic discount factors is equal to ∆% ∩ (Rπ + X⊥), which
is expanded by adding X⊥ and contracted by intersecting with ∆%.
Our method can reproduce the existing approach if we assume %(x) = π˜(−x).
Indeed, our approach is able to reproduce the pricing rule π˜ if and only if the con-
sistency principle holds. If the pricing rule is super-additive, this can be achieved if
and only if π(−x) ≤ %(x), ∀x ∈ X . This implies that R ⊆ ∆%. It can be easily veri-
fied that x 7→ π˜(−x) is the smallest risk measure for which the consistency principle
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holds. The mapping x 7→ π˜(−x) is the market measurement of risk and has been
proposed by Assa and Balba´s (2011). In this case, D⊥ = {0} and ∆% = R, which
yields π% = π. Hence, the hedging problem becomes


min{π˜(y − x) + π(x)}
x ∈ X .
(1.17)
It is clear that since π˜ is sub-additive, x = 0 is a solution to this hedging problem.
Therefore, the pricing rule ππ˜(−.) equals π˜, which reproduces the existing approach
in the literature.
1.4 Appendix: Proofs of Propositions and Theo-
rems
1.4.1 Proof of Theorem 1.2.2
From Delbaen (2002), the equality in Theorem 1.2.2 holds for %α = VaRα. Therefore,
since the minimum is attained for VaRα, for any α there exists %
α ≥ VaRα such that
%α(x0) = VaRα(x0). Now introduce %(x) =
∫ 1
0
%α(x)ϕ(α)dα. It is easy to see that
% is a coherent risk measure such that % ≥ %ϕ and %(x0) = %ϕ(x0), which proves the
desired result.
1.4.2 Proof of Proposition 1.3.1
We only provide the proof of statement 1 since the proof of statement 2 follows very
similar arguments. Let g ∈ Xα and t ∈ R+. Then,
π%(tg) = inf
x∈X
{%(x− tg) + π(x)} = inf
tx∈X
{%(tx− tg) + π(tx)} = tπ%(x) ∈ R.
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Using the same argument, one can show that for g ∈ X%, π%(x + c) = π%(x) + c for
all c ∈ R. Hence, we have that g + c ∈ X%.
Now let g ∈ X% and g ≤ h. Because % is decreasing, we have that
%(x− h) + π(x) ≥ %(x− g) + π(x).
By taking infimum on X , we obtain that π%(h) ∈ R.
1.4.3 Proof of Theorem 1.3.2
We begin by showing the equivalence between (N) and (NGD). To this end, we
demonstrate that both of them are equivalent to the following inequality:
%(x) + π(x) ≥ 0 , ∀x ∈ X . (1.18)
First, we show that (N) is equivalent to (1.18). Given (N), we have that π%(0) = 0
which, by construction, implies (1.18). On the other hand, given (1.18) it is easy to
see that π%(0) ≥ 0. In addition, by setting x = 0 in (1.18), it follows that π%(0) = 0.
Second, we show the equivalence between (1.18) and (NGD). Suppose that x is
a Good Deal, i.e., %(x) < 0 and π(x) ≤ 0, which clearly implies %(x) + π(x) < 0.
On the other hand, if (1.18) does not hold, we have that %(x) + π(x) < 0 for some
position x. By cash-invariance of π and %, it is obvious that x−π(x) is a Good Deal.
Next, we demonstrate the equivalence between (NGD) and (C). Assume that
(NGD) does not hold. Then, there exists an x such that %(x) < 0 and π(x) ≤ 0. Let
y be a variable and assume that c ∈ R is such that y ≤ c. Since tx− y ≥ tx− c for
all t > 0,
%(tx− y) + π(tx) ≤ %(tx− c) + π(tx)
= %(tx) + c+ π(tx)
= t(%(x) + π(x)) + c→ −∞,
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as t tends to +∞. This shows that (1.13) does not have a finite infimum.
To establish (NGD) ⇒ (C), assume that for a variable y, (1.13) does not have a
finite infimum. Let c ∈ R be such that c ≤ y. Since x − c ≥ x − y for all financial
positions x ∈ X , we have that
%(x− c) ≤ %(x− y) ⇒ %(x) + c ≤ %(x− y)
⇒ %(x) + π(x) + c ≤ %(x− y) + π(x).
Since (1.13) is not bounded, then there exists an x such that %(x − y) + π(x) < c.
This yields %(x) + π(x) < 0. Thus, it is clear that x˜ = x− π(x) is a Good Deal.
Finally, we show (N) ⇒ (CP) when X is a vector space and π is super-additive.
Let y ∈ X and suppose that (N) holds. Since X is a vector space, we have that, for
a given x, X − x = X . Therefore, by construction,
%(x− y) + π(x− y) ≥ π%(0) = 0
and by super-additivity of π,
%(x− y) + π(x)− π(y) ≥ %(x− y) + π(x− y) ≥ 0
which implies that %(x− y) + π(x) ≥ π(y). Therefore, π%(y) = π(y).











Hence, χA(x) = sup
z∈A⊥
E(zx). Then, we have









1.4.5 Proof of Theorem 1.3.5
First, we prove the result for sub-additive risk measures and pricing rules. The
following proposition, which is a standard result in the literature on convex analysis,
presents the necessary and sufficient conditions under which solution to the hedging
problem exists.
Proposition 1.4.1 Let f1, f2 : R




{f1(y − x) + f2(x)} = (f ∗1 + f ∗2 )∗(x),
with the convention that sup(∅) = −∞.
In the particular case when f1 = π¯ and f2 = %¯, we have
(f ∗1 + f
∗




{%(x− y) + π(x)} = sup
z∈(∆%−D)∩(R+X⊥)
E(zy).
This proves the existence of the infimum for the sub-additive case.
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In the general case, we have
inf
x∈X




















%(x− y) + π(x)}.
This problem has a finite infimum if for every % ∈ D and π ∈ M, the inner problem
inf
x∈X







In this section, we illustrate the practical relevance of our theoretical results in the
context of hedging economic risk by highlighting the effect of different risk measures
on hedging strategies and the role of X⊥. Our analysis of portfolios that track or hedge
various economic risk variables follows largely Lamont (2001) and Goorbergh, Roon,
and Werker (2003). While these papers employ the mean-variance (MV) framework
for constructing the portfolio of assets, we consider the more general and robust
CVaR and VaR risk measures. Let yt denote an economic risk variable to be hedged
at time t (t = 1, 2, ..., T ), xt = (xt1, ..., xtN)
′ be N securities (traded factors) at time
t and X = span〈x1, . . . , xN〉. The pricing rule is the expected value of the portfolio
given by π(x′tθ) = E(x
′
tθ), where θ = (θ1, . . . , θN)
′.
For the mean-variance risk measure, we have that %(x) = δσ(x) − E(x). To
facilitate the comparison with the other risk measures, the risk aversion parameter
δ is set equal to 1. By plugging x =
∑
















where y˜t = yt − E(yt) and x˜tj = xtj − E(xtj).
For the CVaR risk measure, we rewrite the problem (1.14) with a risk measure
% = %να and a pricing rule π = E as
min
θ
{%να (x′tθ − yt) + E (x′tθ)} (2.2)




%ν1−α (yt − x′tθ) + E (x′tθ)
}
, (2.3)
using that %να (x
′
tθ − yt) = %ν1−α (yt − x′tθ). Then, using translation-invariance and
Theorem 2 in Bassett, Koenker, and Kordas (2004), the problem (2.3) can be rewrit-







ρ1−α (y˜t − ξ − x˜′tθ) , (2.4)
where ρ1−α (u) = u [(1− α)I{u > 0} − αI{u ≤ 0}] and I{·} denotes the indicator
function. Note that since 1 is trivially in the intersection of the sub-gradient set of
these risk measures and R, then it follows from Theorem 1.3.5 there is no Good Deal
and the hedging problem has a solution.
For the VaR hedging problem, we simply minimize the aggregate hedging costs
min
θ
{VaR1−α(yt − x′tθ) + E(x′tθ)}.
One can easily show that the probability measure P belongs to the sub-gradient of any
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law-invariant risk measure which also has properties R2 and R5. Therefore, by using
part 2 of Theorem 1.3.5, the risk measures MV and CVaR do not produce any Good
Deal with the pricing rule E. For VaR, we use the No-Good-Deal assumption and the
theoretical results developed in the previous section. Since X is a vector space and π
is a linear function, then, according to Theorem 1.3.2, the No-Good-Deal assumption
holds if and only if π% (here EVaR) is consistent. Hence,
min
θ
{VaR1−α(yt − x′tθ) + E(x′tθ)} = E(yt).
2.2 Data Description
Our choice of economic risk variables and security returns is similar to Goorbergh,
Roon, and Werker (2003). The data are at monthly frequency for the period February
1952 – December 2012. The traded securities include the risk-free rate, four stock-
market factors (Fama and French (1992), Carhart (1997)) and two bond-market fac-
tors proxied, respectively, by: (i) the one-month T-bill (from Kenneth French’s web-
site), denoted by RF, (ii) the excess return (in excess of the one-month T-bill rate)
on the value-weighted stock market (NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ) index (from Kenneth
French’s website), denoted by MARKET, (iii) the return difference between port-
folios of stocks with small and large market capitalizations (from Kenneth French’s
website), denoted by SMB, (iv) the return difference between portfolios of stocks
with high and low book-to-market ratios (from Kenneth French’s website), denoted
by HML, (v) the momentum factor defined as the average return on the two high
prior return portfolios minus the average return on the two low prior return port-
folios (from Kenneth French’s website), denoted by MOM, (vi) TERM defined as
the difference between the yields of ten-year and one-year government bonds (from
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System), and (vii) DEF defined the
difference between the yields of long-term corporate Baa bonds (from the Board of
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Governors of the Federal Reserve System) and long-term government bonds (from
Ibbotson Associates).
The macroeconomic risk variables include (i) the inflation rate measured as monthly
percentage changes in CPI for all urban consumers (all items, from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics), denoted by INF, (ii) the real interest rate measured as the monthly
real yield on the one-month T-bill (from CRSP, Fama Risk Free Rates), denoted by
RI, (iii) the term spread measured as the difference between the 10-year Treasury
(constant maturity) and 3-month (secondary market) T-bill rate (from the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System), denoted by TS, (iv) the default spread
measured as the difference between corporate Baa and Aaa rated (by Moody’s In-
vestor Service) bonds (from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System),
denoted by DS, (v) the monthly dividend yield on value-weighted stock market port-
folio (from the Center for Research in Security Prices, CRSP), denoted by DIV, and
(vi) the monthly growth rate in real per capita total (seasonally-adjusted) consump-
tion (from the Bureau of Economic Analysis), denoted by CG.
2.3 Results
In order to hedge against unexpected economic shocks, we follow Campbell (1996)
and replace the variable yt with the corresponding error term form a six-variable
VAR(1) model of yt (y = [INF,RI, TS,DS,DIV, CG]). For VaR and CVaR, we
use α = 0.1 and 0.05 (i.e., 1 − a = 0.9 and 0.95). The standard errors for VaR and
CVaR are computed by bootstrapping. Statistically significant coefficients at the 5%
nominal level are reported in bold font. The results for hedging inflation, real interest
rate, term spread, default spread, dividend yield and consumption growth using the
three risk measures are presented in tables 2.1 to 2.6, respectively. The last line in
each table reports the computed price.
A number of interesting findings emerge from this hedging exercise. First, as it
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was noted in section 4.1, if the pricing rule E is correctly specified, the price should
equal E(y) (in the VaR case we also need to know if y is fully hedged). Tables 2.1
to 2.6 reveal that in all cases, the prices are significantly different from E(y), which
is attributed to the unhedged part in pricing y. These results highlight the role of
the set X⊥. Indeed, the true stochastic discount factor lies in the larger set X⊥ ∩∆%
for MV and CVaR, while for VaR we have a family of ∆%’s as in part 2 of Theorem
1.3.5. Our theory suggests that the true SDF has to represented as P + z, where z
belongs to X⊥.
Second, while there is agreement across the different risk measures in hedging
term spread, dividend yield and, to some extent, consumption growth, the hedging
of inflation, real interest rate and default spread exhibit substantial heterogeneity
both across and within risk measures. For example, CVaR suggests that RF, SMB
and TERM prove to be important factors for hedging inflation whereas the other
risk measures indicate that these factors are largely insignificant. Furthermore, there
are differences across the different quantile regressions for CVaR and in some cases,
depending on the level of α, the investor needs to switch from ‘long’ to ‘short’ positions
in order to hedge the underlying economic risk. This illustrates the potential of
alternative risk measures for robustifying the performance of economic portfolios.
2.4 Estimating the Stochastic Discount Factor
In this section we provide estimation methods to estimate Stochastic Discount Factors
for two particular cases. Following the literature on pricing we confine ourselves to the
set of the admissible stochastic discount factors. This means we are only interested
in a set SDF which can correctly price a set of the assets, called test assets. As we
have discussed earlier, we denote the set of test assets as R1, ..., RN and their correct
corresponding price as p1, ..., pN
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SDF = {z ≥ 0|E(z) = 1, E(zRi) = pi, i = 1, ..., N}.





We have chosen the excess return of Fama and French 25 portfolio assets, denoted
by R1, ...., R25, plus the risk free asset, denoted by x0. In addition we assume the
martingale condition for correct prices as follows
pi = 0 , i = 1, ..., 25 and p0 = 1.
In order to estimate a SDF we have to make some assumptions. Given discussions
in Cochrane (2009) a legitimate economical assumption is to assume that a SDF can
be determined by the economy-wide consumer’s preferences and consumption. The
next legitimate assumption is that the consumer’s decision is a function of macro-
economic factors. Therefore, we use a linear model for SDF by using the macro
economic factors (as proxy for the systemic factors), as is generally practiced in the
literature. Any SDF can model as follows
g(γ) = fTγ,
where f is aK×1 vector ofK systemic factors, and γ is aK vector of SDF parameters.
2.4.1 General Methodology
In this section we develop a general methodology, in order to make use it in the next
sections to estimate γ associated with the linear models of the stochastic discount
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factors. Our strategy is to design a nonnegative function Q(x) such that for a given
set ∆
x ∈ ∆⇔ Q(x) = 0.
Simply since the function Q attains its minimum at a point x belonging to ∆, by




In the following estimations, we minimize an objective function in the following
form




where q, rj, j = 1, ..., J are smooth functions of the parameters and sample data, and
hj are two times differentiable functions. The empirical version can be written as


















It is straightforward to see that γˆ is consistent. However, the asymptomatic
normality of the estimator needs some computational effort which is done in the
Appendix. Here we just present the result as follows
T 1/2(γˆ − γ0)→ N (0, V ),


































Note that h′ is the derivative of h (not the transpose).
2.4.2 Set of Admissible SDF
As we mentioned earlier we chose the set of all admissible assets based on true prices
of the Fama and French 25 portfolio. Therefore we have to design an appropriate
objective function which can capture this set. The objective function we need can be
introduced by the following elements


ri(γ, ft) = γftxit i = 1, ..., 25 and t = 1, ..., T
h(x) = xL25
,
where L25 is a large even number and it is reported in Table 2.7 for each model. In
the following we assume different No Good Deal conditions and the associated sets,
which will result in different pricing models. In each of them we assume that the
objective function is the summation of the one we have introduced above, to keep us
in the admissible set, and the one associated with the underling risk measure in use.
2.4.3 No Arbitrage
First we find an stochastic discount factor on which we do not pose any restriction,
which is equivalent to No -Arbitrage case. Therefore, we only need E(g(γ)) = 1 and
g(γ) > 0 

qt(γ, ft) =M(−γft) t = 1, ..., T




where LNA is a large even number and it is reported in Table 2.7 for each model. In




0 x < 0
xLsmooth x ≥ 0
,
where Lsmooth is a large even number reported on Table 2.7 for each model. The first
equation is set to guarantee g(γ) ≥ 0 and the second and third equations are set to
ensure E(g(γ)) = 1. The choice of L is a large number to penalize any deviation from
r = 0 and are reported in the estimation tables. The choice of L and L′ depend on
how much we want to penalize deviation from our conditions. These two numbers will
play an important role in asymptomatic, implying that we cannot choose them too
large (or small), since otherwise the resulting variance-covariance matrix is singular.
We will report them once we report the result for the estimation.
2.4.4 Bounded SDF
In this part we assume that the set of SDF consists of all non-negative random
variables with mean one whose maximum value is less than or equal to a bound c > 0
i.e., ∀z ∈SDF, z ≤ c. Since any member of SDF has mean one, it is clear that c ≥ 1.
Taking α = 1
c
, it is clear that this is equivalent to the hedging problem 1.13, when
we use % = CVaRα. According to the parametric linear model we assumed for a SDF
this means that we have to estimate γ so that g(γ) ≤ c = 1
α
. We set for the following
functions in the objective


qt(γ, ft) =M(γft − 1α) +M(−γft) t = 1, ..., T




where LCVaR is a large even number reported on Table 2.7 for each model. The first
function is to capture 0 ≤ g(γ) ≤ 1
α
and the second and third one are to capture
E(g(γ)) = 1. Note that M has to be smooth enough, and takes positive values if and
only if its argument is positive.
2.4.5 Bounded Variance
In Cochrane and Saa-Requejo (2000), the authors introduced for the first time the
concept of Good Deal. They show that in their setting the No Good Deal assumption
is equivalent to setting an upper bound on the variance of the set of SDFs. In
mathematical terms let c be a positive number, the No Good Deal assumption holds if
for any g ∈ SDF, σ(g) ≤ c. According to the theory we have developed in this chapter,
this is equivalent to a hedging problem that uses the CS-risk measure % = %CSc . Given
that E(g) = 1, ∀g ∈SDF, the No Good Deal assumption is equivalent to saying that
E(g2) ≤ c2 − 1 and E(g) = 1. Therefore we have the following functions


qt(γ, ft) =M(−γft) t = 1, ..., T
r1(γ, ft) = γft − 1 t = 1, ..., T
r2(γ, ft) = (γft)





where LCS is a large even number and it is reported in table 2.7 for each model. The
first equation is set to guarantee g(λ) ≥ 0, r1 and h1 to ensure E(g(γ)) = 1 and r2




Finally we used the mean-variance risk measure. It is not very difficult to see that
the sub-gradient of MVδ can be represented as:
∆MVδ = {z ∈ Rn|E(z) = 1, σ(z) = δ}.
Therefore, 

r1(γ, ft) = γft − 1 t = 1, ..., T
r2(γ, ft) = (γft)
2 − c2 + 1
h1(x) = h2(x) = x
LMV
.
where LMV is a large even number and it is reported in table 2.7 for each model.
However, one can see that the members of the set ∆MVδ are not necessarily positive,
which can yield some Arbitrage opportunities.
2.4.7 Models
We use two different models, one model with traded factors and the other non-traded
factors.
FF3. The fist model is the most popular factor model in the finance literature, the
three factor Fama and French model. In this model f has three factors, Market, Size
and Book-to-Market. Therefore,
g(γ) = γ0 + γ1(RM −RF ) + γ2SMB + γ3HML.
CAY.The second model is the (CC-CAY) which is a conditional version of the
CCAPM due to Lettau and Ludvigson (2001). The relation is
g(γ) = γ0 + γ1consumption + γ2L(cay) + γ2consumption× L(cay) (2.5)
37
where cay, the conditioning variable, is a consumption-aggregate wealth ratio, and L
is the lag operator. This specification is obtained by scaling the constant term and
the c factor of a linearized consumption CAPM by a constant and cay.
The results are presented in Tables 2.8 to 2.15. There are different observation
from the results, but we focus our attention only on the most important ones.
First of all, observe that while the stochastic discount factors resulting from the
No Arbitrage restriction and the ones from the No Good Deal assumption using CVaR
of 1,5 and 10% are exactly the same. The results for all No Good Deal constraint
are similar in direction, which shows the consistency between results; using the FF3
model all go short on RM-RF, SMB and HML, while on the other hand, they go
short on consumption and consumption× L(cay), and long on L(cay).
Tantamount results for the NA and CVaR show that all estimation methods find
their stochastic discount factors within the smallest set ∆CVaR0.1 .
We have included two different type of factors to compare different risk measures
we have used in this chapter, in two different type of models when we have only traded
securities or we have only non-traded ones. In all cases we impose the condition
that the stochastic discount factor has mean one. Therefore, if we measure the
performance of each method by measuring mean of γf , according to its distance
from one, then one can see among all different methods by NA and CVaR very well
capture mean one and others perform poorly. It is interesting to see that in both
models either not imposing any condition but the No Arbitrage or the CVaR (bounded
SDF), we get much better results, by our performance measure. It is also interesting
the CS and MV conditions (bounded variance), seem less restrictive than CVaR and
more restrictive than No Arbitrage, it is impossible to improve upon the performance
measure. This might be because the variance controlling conditions along with the
methods we have used in this chapter generate some mis-specification problems.
Another interesting point is when we compare the two different models. In the
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FF3 model, as one can see, the main load is due to risk free. It can be concluded
when we observe how close the mean of the estimated SDF is to the risk free factor,
and how small are the other ones. The meaning of this fact is that the prices could
be mostly explained by the risk free factor, which does not seem plausible for risky
portfolios. This is not the case for the second model, one can see that the variety of
the coefficients.



















By using the first-order Taylor series expansion of ∂
∂γ











Q(γ∗)(γˆ − γ0), (2.6)
where γ∗ is an intermediate point on the line joining γˆ and γ0. This shows that we
have to derive the distribution of ∂
∂γ














































































MV CVaR0.9 CVaR0.95 VaR0.9 VaR0.95
Intercept 0.0026 0.0022
( 0.0001) ( 0.0002)
RF 0.0072 -0.6737 -0.7844 0.0058 0.0027
( 0.0558) ( 0.0705) ( 0.1106) ( 0.0041) ( 0.0019)
MARKET -0.0048 -0.0072 -0.0123 -0.0038 -0.0066
( 0.0029) ( 0.0030) ( 0.0043) ( 0.0013) ( 0.0023)
SMB -0.0008 0.0131 0.0383 -0.0008 -0.0003
( 0.0030) ( 0.0048) ( 0.0065) ( 0.0005) ( 0.0002)
HML 0.0022 0.0013 -0.0009 0.0038 0.0031
( 0.0042) ( 0.0013) ( 0.0006) ( 0.0016) ( 0.0023)
UMD 0.0015 0.0006 0.0002 0.0019 0.0023
( 0.0027) ( 0.0006) ( 0.0001) ( 0.0012) ( 0.0015)
TERM 0.0084 -0.1427 -0.1440 0.0025 0.0104
( 0.0109) ( 0.0162) ( 0.0263) ( 0.0018) ( 0.0070)
DEF -0.0265 0.1063 0.1370 -0.0246 -0.0227
( 0.0242) ( 0.0209) ( 0.0369) ( 0.0080) ( 0.0117)
Price 0.0023 0.0077 0.0093 0.0025 0.0037
( 0.0000) ( 0.0000) ( 0.0001) ( 0.0000) ( 0.0001)
Table 2.1: Hedging Inflation.
The table reports the estimates and their corresponding bootstrap errors (based on
400 bootstrap replications) for different risk measures (mean-variance MV,
conditional value-at-risk CVaR, and value-at-risk VaR). The bold font represents
statistical significance (at the 5% nominal level) of individual coefficients except for
the last row where the bold font signifies a statistically different price from E(y).
42
MV CVaR0.9 CVaR0.95 VaR0.9 VaR0.95
Intercept 0.0021 0.0035
( 0.0001) ( 0.0002)
RF -0.0304 -0.1473 -0.6805 -0.0147 -0.0296
( 0.0563) ( 0.0621) ( 0.1000) ( 0.0063) ( 0.0380)
MARKET 0.0049 -0.0020 0.0094 0.0048 0.0038
( 0.0028) ( 0.0017) ( 0.0045) ( 0.0015) ( 0.0032)
SMB 0.0013 -0.0009 0.0042 0.0009 0.0013
( 0.0029) ( 0.0007) ( 0.0033) ( 0.0003) ( 0.0020)
HML -0.0029 -0.0142 0.0188 -0.0031 -0.0031
( 0.0042) ( 0.0042) ( 0.0072) ( 0.0012) ( 0.0037)
UMD -0.0008 -0.0346 -0.0011 -0.0007 -0.0007
( 0.0027) ( 0.0031) ( 0.0008) ( 0.0003) ( 0.0013)
TERM -0.0167 -0.0664 -0.1187 -0.0284 -0.0166
( 0.0109) ( 0.0123) ( 0.0239) ( 0.0065) ( 0.0133)
DEF 0.0205 0.1095 0.2810 0.0222 0.0226
( 0.0244) ( 0.0194) ( 0.0305) ( 0.0073) ( 0.0186)
Price 0.0023 0.0075 0.0110 0.0027 0.0035
( 0.0000) ( 0.0000) ( 0.0001) ( 0.0000) ( 0.0001)
Table 2.2: Hedging Real Interest Rate.
The table reports the estimates and their corresponding bootstrap errors (based on
400 bootstrap replications) for different risk measures (mean-variance MV,
conditional value-at-risk CVaR, and value-at-risk VaR). The bold font represents
statistical significance (at the 5% nominal level) of individual coefficients except for
the last row where the bold font signifies a statistically different price from E(y).
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MV CVaR0.9 CVaR0.95 VaR0.9 VaR0.95
Intercept -0.0000 -0.0000
( 0.0012) ( 0.0018)
RF 0.3958 0.3782 0.3696 0.3886 0.3883
( 0.0922) ( 0.0877) ( 0.1094) ( 0.0526) ( 0.0898)
MARKET 0.0011 -0.0023 -0.0016 0.0018 0.0006
( 0.0043) ( 0.0061) ( 0.0095) ( 0.0005) ( 0.0006)
SMB 0.0034 0.0047 0.0033 0.0026 0.0028
( 0.0048) ( 0.0092) ( 0.0138) ( 0.0008) ( 0.0016)
HML 0.0071 0.0010 0.0013 0.0091 0.0078
( 0.0053) ( 0.0227) ( 0.0230) ( 0.0021) ( 0.0042)
UMD -0.0038 -0.0017 -0.0015 -0.0065 -0.0051
( 0.0042) ( 0.0069) ( 0.0099) ( 0.0018) ( 0.0026)
TERM 0.1346 0.1055 0.1024 0.1277 0.1532
( 0.0163) ( 0.0194) ( 0.0242) ( 0.0126) ( 0.0251)
DEF -0.0691 -0.0789 -0.0756 -0.0926 -0.0571
( 0.0296) ( 0.0307) ( 0.0341) ( 0.0138) ( 0.0268)
Price 0.0033 0.0057 0.0082 0.0029 0.0044
( 0.0000) ( 0.0001) ( 0.0002) ( 0.0001) ( 0.0002)
Table 2.3: Hedging Term Spread.
The table reports the estimates and their corresponding bootstrap errors (based on
400 bootstrap replications) for different risk measures (mean-variance MV,
conditional value-at-risk CVaR, and value-at-risk VaR). The bold font represents
statistical significance (at the 5% nominal level) of individual coefficients except for
the last row where the bold font signifies a statistically different price from E(y).
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MV CVaR0.9 CVaR0.95 VaR0.9 VaR0.95
Intercept 0.0010 0.0011
( 0.0000) ( 0.0001)
RF -0.0616 0.0358 -0.0017 -0.0572 -0.0359
( 0.0335) ( 0.0214) ( 0.0010) ( 0.0119) ( 0.0133)
MARKET -0.0008 0.0002 0.0115 -0.0011 -0.0005
( 0.0018) ( 0.0001) ( 0.0026) ( 0.0003) ( 0.0002)
SMB -0.0015 0.0030 -0.0090 -0.0016 -0.0027
( 0.0014) ( 0.0015) ( 0.0036) ( 0.0005) ( 0.0011)
HML -0.0005 0.0091 0.0177 -0.0004 -0.0001
( 0.0023) ( 0.0015) ( 0.0040) ( 0.0001) ( 0.0001)
UMD -0.0003 0.0026 0.0097 -0.0002 -0.0000
( 0.0012) ( 0.0010) ( 0.0026) ( 0.0001) ( 0.0000)
TERM -0.0147 -0.0153 -0.0169 -0.0135 -0.0005
( 0.0049) ( 0.0051) ( 0.0082) ( 0.0025) ( 0.0003)
DEF 0.0503 0.1078 0.0965 0.0498 0.0882
( 0.0125) ( 0.0063) ( 0.0158) ( 0.0052) ( 0.0079)
Price 0.0011 0.0036 0.0048 0.0009 0.0016
( 0.0000) ( 0.0000) ( 0.0001) ( 0.0000) ( 0.0001)
Table 2.4: Hedging Default Spread.
The table reports the estimates and their corresponding bootstrap errors (based on
400 bootstrap replications) for different risk measures (mean-variance MV,
conditional value-at-risk CVaR, and value-at-risk VaR). The bold font represents
statistical significance (at the 5% nominal level) of individual coefficients except for
the last row where the bold font signifies a statistically different price from E(y).
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MV CVaR0.9 CVaR0.95 VaR0.9 VaR0.95
Intercept 0.0007 0.0011
( 0.0001) ( 0.0001)
RF -0.0735 -0.0323 -0.0794 -0.0774 -0.0736
( 0.0148) ( 0.0291) ( 0.0352) ( 0.0074) ( 0.0104)
MARKET -0.0309 -0.0313 -0.0343 -0.0293 -0.0313
( 0.0010) ( 0.0015) ( 0.0017) ( 0.0012) ( 0.0016)
SMB -0.0000 0.0004 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
( 0.0012) ( 0.0007) ( 0.0000) ( 0.0000) ( 0.0000)
HML -0.0028 -0.0026 -0.0020 -0.0029 -0.0032
( 0.0014) ( 0.0021) ( 0.0019) ( 0.0004) ( 0.0005)
UMD -0.0012 0.0016 -0.0028 -0.0013 -0.0015
( 0.0008) ( 0.0012) ( 0.0015) ( 0.0002) ( 0.0002)
TERM -0.0036 0.0146 -0.0163 -0.0035 -0.0040
( 0.0029) ( 0.0069) ( 0.0067) ( 0.0006) ( 0.0008)
DEF -0.0038 -0.0152 0.0276 -0.0037 0.0010
( 0.0044) ( 0.0083) ( 0.0105) ( 0.0008) ( 0.0002)
Price 0.0007 0.0018 0.0028 0.0007 0.0010
( 0.0000) ( 0.0000) ( 0.0000) ( 0.0000) ( 0.0000)
Table 2.5: Hedging Dividend Yield.
The table reports the estimates and their corresponding bootstrap errors (based on
400 bootstrap replications) for different risk measures (mean-variance MV,
conditional value-at-risk CVaR, and value-at-risk VaR). The bold font represents
statistical significance (at the 5% nominal level) of individual coefficients except for
the last row where the bold font signifies a statistically different price from E(y).
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MV CVaR0.9 CVaR0.95 VaR0.9 VaR0.95
Intercept 0.0059 0.0080
( 0.0003) ( 0.0005)
RF -0.2533 -0.0510 0.0696 -0.2882 -0.1159
( 0.1112) ( 0.0718) ( 0.1184) ( 0.0672) ( 0.0788)
MARKET 0.0082 0.0079 -0.0067 0.0074 0.0048
( 0.0056) ( 0.0062) ( 0.0102) ( 0.0023) ( 0.0037)
SMB 0.0256 0.0315 0.0467 0.0288 0.0237
( 0.0080) ( 0.0097) ( 0.0169) ( 0.0051) ( 0.0094)
HML 0.0132 0.0079 -0.0096 0.0034 0.0108
( 0.0080) ( 0.0089) ( 0.0141) ( 0.0020) ( 0.0075)
UMD -0.0034 0.0334 0.0546 -0.0032 -0.0032
( 0.0052) ( 0.0073) ( 0.0120) ( 0.0015) ( 0.0028)
TERM -0.0509 -0.0581 -0.0070 -0.0835 -0.0819
( 0.0241) ( 0.0223) ( 0.0160) ( 0.0165) ( 0.0263)
DEF -0.0568 0.0005 0.1904 -0.0562 -0.0802
( 0.0312) ( 0.0007) ( 0.0648) ( 0.0178) ( 0.0332)
Price 0.0054 0.0159 0.0223 0.0064 0.0083
( 0.0000) ( 0.0001) ( 0.0002) ( 0.0001) ( 0.0002)
Table 2.6: Hedging Consumption Growth.
The table reports the estimates and their corresponding bootstrap errors (based on
400 bootstrap replications) for different risk measures (mean-variance MV,
conditional value-at-risk CVaR, and value-at-risk VaR). The bold font represents
statistical significance (at the 5% nominal level) of individual coefficients except for
the last row where the bold font signifies a statistically different price from E(y).
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Model Lsmooth L25 LNA LCVaR LCS LMV
FF3 6 6 2 2 2 2
CAY 6 6 2 2 2 2
Table 2.7: Values for Lsmooth, L25, LNA, LCVaR, LCS, LMV, LNAMV.
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γ0 γ1 γ2 γ3 mean(γf)
0.9975 -0.0407 -0.0146 -0.1140 0.9964
(0.0019) (0.0028) (0.0061) (0.0047) (0.0010)
Table 2.8: FF3 model, No Arbitrage
α γ0 γ1 γ2 γ3 mean(γf)
1,5,10% 0.9975 -0.0407 -0.0146 -0.1140 0.9964
(0.0019) (0.0028) (0.0061) (0.0047) (0.0010)
Table 2.9: FF3 model, CVaR
c γ0 γ1 γ2 γ3 mean(γf)
0.1 0.2311 -0.0026 -0.0023 -0.0016 0.2316
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0001)
0.25 0.2467 -0.0031 -0.0027 -0.0019 0.2473
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0001)
1 0.6281 -0.0161 -0.0196 -0.0388 0.6321
(0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0020) (0.0010) (0.0005)
Table 2.10: FF3 model, CS
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δ γ0 γ1 γ2 γ3 mean(γf)
0.1 0.3132 -0.0015 -0.0013 -0.0010 0.3135
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) ( 0.0001) ( 0.0001)
0.25 0.3223 -0.0017 -0.0016 -0.0011 0.3227
( 0.0001) ( 0.0001) ( 0.0002) ( 0.0001) ( 0.0001)
1 0.5814 -0.0120 -0.0112 -0.0085 0.5840
( 0.0003) ( 0.0006) ( 0.0011) ( 0.0008) ( 0.0002)
Table 2.11: FF3 model, MV
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γ0 γ1 γ2 γ3 mean(γf)
1.2822 -0.6862 0.5187 -0.3580 0.9444
( 0.0492) ( 0.0792) ( 0.1171) ( 0.2623) ( 0.0134)
Table 2.12: CAY, No Arbitrage
α γ0 γ1 γ2 γ3 mean(γf)
1,5,10% 1.2822 -0.6862 0.5187 -0.3580 0.9444
( 0.0492) ( 0.0792) ( 0.1171) ( 0.2623) ( 0.0134)
Table 2.13: CAY, CVaR
c γ0 γ1 γ2 γ3 mean(γf)
0.1 0.2338 -0.0046 0.0009 -0.0005 0.2313
( 0.0013) ( 0.0019) ( 0.0008) ( 0.0014) ( 0.0006)
0.25 0.2499 -0.0068 0.0014 -0.0008 0.2462
( 0.0019) ( 0.0028) ( 0.0012) ( 0.0020) ( 0.0008)
1 0.7772 -0.3847 0.0880 -0.0484 0.5657
( 0.0586) ( 0.0874) ( 0.0726) ( 0.1219) ( 0.0101)
Table 2.14: CAY, CS
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δ γ0 γ1 γ2 γ3 mean(γf)
0.1 0.3147 -0.0005 0.0001 -0.0001 0.3144
( 0.0001) ( 0.0002) ( 0.0001) ( 0.0001) ( 0.0001)
0.25 0.3241 -0.0006 0.0001 -0.0001 0.3238
( 0.0002) ( 0.0003) ( 0.0001) ( 0.0002) ( 0.0001)
1 0.6287 -0.1168 0.0258 -0.0156 0.5645
( 0.0219) ( 0.0321) ( 0.0199) ( 0.0334) ( 0.0049)
Table 2.15: CAY, MV
52
Chapter 3
A Staggered Pricing Approach to
Modeling Speculative Storage:
Implications For Commodity Price
Dynamics
The last decade has witnessed a surge in commodity prices and a widespread fi-
nancialization of commodity products. The upward movements and the increased
volatility of the commodity prices have been largely attributed to strong demand by
China and other emerging markets as well as massive capital flows into the commod-
ity markets by institutional investors, portfolio managers and speculators. While the
importance of commodity price movements for the economic policy and investors’
sentiment has generated a substantial research interest, the behavior and the deter-
mination of commodity prices is not yet fully understood. The main objective of
this paper is to develop a structural model of commodity price determination that
reflects the empirical properties (high persistence and conditional heteroskedasticity)
of commodity prices. In order to achieve this goal and to gain further understanding
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into the fundamental factors that drive the observed behavior of commodity prices,
we modify the structure of the speculative storage model from one where the prices
adjust almost instantaneously to harvest shocks to a setup where they change slowly
and infrequently. More specifically, we depart from the assumption that market
prices are determined in a perfectly competitive environment and extend the basic
speculative storage model by explicitly introducing intermediate goods speculators
with a staggered pricing rule. One appealing aspect of this approach is its ability to
mimic some important characteristics of the actual commodity prices such as high
persistence and conditional heteroskedasticity, which can be generated even in the
absence of correlated harvest shocks.
The speculative storage model for commodity prices can be dated back to Gustafson
(1958) who defines a set of optimal storage rules that state how much grain should
be carried over into the next period given the current year supply. Moreover, by
introducing intertemporal storage arbitrage and supply shocks, Gustafson (1958) in-
corporates rational expectations. This line of research is further elaborated in Muth
(1961). Samuelson (1971) develops a model for commodities which determines the
behavior of the prices as the solution to a stochastic dynamic programming problem.
Furthermore, Beck (1993) builds upon the work by Muth (1961) and provides a the-
oretical basis for treating the variance of storable commodities as serially correlated
which suggests that commodity prices may exhibit conditional heteroskedasticity.
The presence of storage is instrumental in ensuring that the price variance in one pe-
riod directly affects inventory variance which in turn is transmitted to next period’s
price variation. Williams and Wright (1991) provide a comprehensive discussion of
the basic storage model and its extensions, and summarize the time series proper-
ties of storable commodities. Williams and Wright (1991) put an emphasis on the
complex non-linear storage behavior resulting from the fact that aggregate storage
cannot be negative.
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Deaton and Laroque (1992, 1995, 1996) develop a partial equilibrium structural
model of commodity price determination and apply numerical methods to test and
estimate the model parameters, confronting for the first time the storage model with
the documented behavior of actual prices. Their analysis suggests that the introduc-
tion of speculative inventories and serially correlated supply shocks do not appear to
generate sufficient persistence in commodity prices although they prove to be suc-
cessful in replicating the substantial volatility observed in the actual data.
More recently, numerous studies have focused on modifying the storage model in
order to accommodate the persistence of commodity prices. Chambers and Bailey
(1996) relax the iid assumption on harvest shocks, and study the price fluctuations
of storable commodities, assuming that shocks are either time dependent or that the
model exhibits periodic disturbances. Ng and Ruge-Murcia (2000) incorporate addi-
tional features into the storage model in an attempt to generate a higher degree of
persistence in commodity prices. In particular, Ng and Ruge-Murcia (2000) allow for
serially correlated shocks assuming that harvest follows a first-order moving average
(MA(1)) process. They also examine the ability of production lags and heteroskedas-
tic supply shocks, multi-period forward contracts and convenience yields to generate
an increased persistence in commodity prices. Cafiero, Bobenrieth, Bobenrieth, and
Wright (2011) demonstrate that the competitive storage model can give rise to high
levels of serial correlation observed in commodity prices if more precise numerical
methods are employed. Moreover, estimates for seven commodities supported the
specification of the speculative storage model with positive constant marginal costs
and no deterioration, which is in line with Gustafson (1958).
Furthermore, Cafiero, Bobenrieth, Bobenrieth, and Wright (2011) use a maxi-
mum likelihood framework to estimate the storage model with stock-outs, which is
extended to include unbounded harvests and free disposal. Their results produce
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more accurate small sample estimates of the structural parameters of the model com-
pared to the previous studies based on the pseudo-maximum likelihood procedure.
Miao and Funke (2011) add shocks to the trends of output and demand. Evans and
Guthrie (2007) include transaction cost frictions into the speculative storage model.
One important finding that emerges from their analysis is that these frictions tend
to have explanatory power for the dynamic behavior of spot and futures commodity
prices. In a competitive equilibrium framework, the model of Evans and Guthrie
(2007) is able to capture the serial correlation and GARCH characteristics of com-
modity prices. Finally, Arseneau and Leduc (2012) embed the speculative storage
model into a general equilibrium framework. Their main result is that the interac-
tion between storage and interest rates in general equilibrium increases the impact
of competitive storage on commodity prices and leads to higher persistence than the
one observed in the storage model with fixed interest rate.
In spite of this extensive literature for understanding the determinants and the
dynamic patterns of commodity prices, reproducing the documented high persistence
and conditional heteroskedasticity of actual prices within a well-articulated structural
model proved to be a challenging task. In this paper, we address the issues regarding
the commodity price dynamics in a unified fashion by embedding a staggered pricing
mechanism into the speculative storage model. While Arseneau and Leduc (2012) also
suggest to “introduce staggered price setting on the part of the final goods producing
firm” in a general equilibrium framework as a possible extension for future research,
our paper is the first to implement this approach and assess the properties of the
model-generated commodity prices against the observed data.
In an attempt to depart from the assumption of perfect competition at both the
production and storage activity, Newbery (1984), Williams and Wright (1991), and
McLaren (1999) investigate the effects of market power on the storage behavior. Our
model differs from their work along the dimension that the final bundler does not
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store the good and the storage is only done by intermediate risk neutral speculators.
The final bundler only bundles intermediate prices in order to set the final price.
Finally, Mitraille and Thille (2009) examine the market power in production with
competitive storage by analyzing the effects that competitive storage has on the
behavior of a monopolist. Using his market power, the monopolist can influence
speculative activity by manipulating prices and consequently affect the distribution
of prices. One of the findings of Mitraille and Thille (2009) is that stockouts occur
less frequently under monopoly.
The focus of this paper is on the improved ability of the storage model with
staggered prices to account for the empirical features of commodity prices. The main
impact of staggered prices in our model is to dampen the movements in prices as
well as the market power of intermediate speculators to affect prices. This leads
to gradual adjustments and persistent responses of prices following a harvest shock.
In addition to generating sufficient persistence in commodity prices, the staggered
pricing approach allows us to match other important moments in the unconditional
and conditional distributions of the commodity prices.
Nominal price rigidity is often incorporated in dynamic general equilibrium models
with two widely used nominal price rigidity specifications in the literature. On one
hand, the partial adjustment model developed by Calvo (1983), Rotemberg (1987),
and Rotemberg (1996) allows for only a randomly chosen fraction of firms to adjust
their prices according to some constant hazard rate in any given period. On the
other hand, the staggered price setting rule adopted by Taylor (1980) and Blanchard
and Fisher (1989) permits all firms to optimize their prices after a fixed number of
periods.
In this paper, we assume that the pricing decisions are staggered as in Calvo
(1983) and use a similar modeling framework as the one developed in McCandless
(2008). Even though the staggered pricing is not generated endogenously within the
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model, it serves as a useful device to impart the inefficiencies in the agricultural com-
modity markets such as price floors, subsidies, import/export quotas and controls,
government strategic stock reserves, collusion etc. that prevent prices to adjust in-
stantaneously to changes in economic conditions. Note that these types of market
inefficiencies induce some product differentiation and allow us to depart from the typ-
ical assumption in the literature that commodities tend to be homogeneous products
whose prices are fully flexible and equal to their marginal costs. Our results confirm
the importance of staggered prices for commodity price dynamics and suggest that
the staggered pricing mechanism appears to be consistent with the behavior of the
actual data. Moreover, we show how our model can be used to analyze the response
of commodity prices to harvest shocks which provides a framework for economic and
policy evaluation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The competitive storage model
with staggered prices as well as the statistical characterizations of this model are
presented in Section 2. Section 3 studies the practical implications of our staggered
price speculative storage model using simulated data. Section 4 contains a brief
description of the data and the estimation method used in the paper, and presents
the main empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
3.1 Competitive Storage Model with Staggered Prices
This section introduces the model setup and characterizes the equilibrium and sta-
tistical behavior of the model-generated commodity prices.
3.1.1 Model and Equilibrium Price Behavior
The rational expectations model determines the optimal inventory decisions by risk-
neutral speculators. The basic version of the model developed by Deaton and Laroque
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(1992, 1995, 1996)1 incorporates competitive storage into the consumer demand and
supply dynamics and establishes the concept of stationary rational expectations equi-
librium (SREE). The model with serial correlation in harvest shocks is tested by Ng
and Ruge-Murcia (2000). In their paper, Ng and Ruge-Murcia (2000) consider an
MA(1) specification for the model harvest shocks. Our model complements and
extends the original DL model by embedding a staggered price setting into the spec-
ulative storage model. Regarding the harvest shock specification, we consider both
(i) iid harvest shocks and (ii) MA(1) harvests shocks.
Our modified model has three types of commodity market participants: final
consumers, intermediate risk neutral speculators and a bundler2 who bundles the
commodities in order to set the final price. In the absence of storage, the behavior
of final consumers is characterized by a linear inverse demand function
pt = P (zt) = a+ bzt,
where a and b < 0 are parameters to be estimated and zt denotes the harvest in
period t.
Let the harvest zt be given by
zt = z¯ + ut,
where z¯ is constant (perfectly inelastic) and ut is a random disturbance term which
1For brevity, we denote hereafter the basic speculative storage model of Deaton and Laroque by
DL.
2In the literature, it is common to use the term “monopolist” instead of the term “bundler” that
we employ in this paper. The reason that we prefer the latter is the following: in the staggered
pricing literature, the final goods producer maximizes profits by setting the price. In this paper, we
do not consider any profit maximization and any type of price setting for the final goods producer.
Instead, we use directly the final goods prices as set in (3.6).
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is assumed either to be iid or to follow an MA(1) process
ut = et + ρet−1,
where et is iid(0, σ
2). If ρ = 0, we have the case of iid shocks as in DL, and when
ρ > 0, we have MA(1) shocks as in Ng and Ruge-Murcia (2000). In this paper, we
investigate both cases and show that when we add staggered prices, the case for ρ = 0
gives better results compared to the case of non-staggered prices and ρ > 0.
Intermediate risk neutral speculators or inventory holders know the current year
harvest and demand the commodity to transfer to the next period. They will do
so whenever they expect to make a profit above the storage and interest cost. The
depreciation rate of storage is denoted by δ. A simple form of proportional deteriora-
tion is considered which means that if in period t the speculators store I units of the
commodity, they have at their disposal (1 − δ)I units at the beginning of the next
period. Moreover, speculators have to pay the real interest rate on the value of their
storage. Let r denotes the constant exogenous real interest rate. The sum of harvest
and inherited inventories, denoted by xt, is referred to as the amount on hand and is
given by
xt = (1− δ)It−1 + zt.
The relationship between the amount of storage and its net profit can be summarized
as 

It > 0 if (1− δ)/(1 + r)Et[pt+1] = pt,
It = 0 otherwise,
where Et denotes the expectation given the information at time t.
The condition for non-negative inventories is the crucial source of non-linearity
in the model. This specification does not allow the market participants to borrow
commodities that have not yet been grown. In addition, intermediate speculators
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benefit from market power that reflects their ability to affect the price. In this
framework, we assume that there is a continuum of intermediate speculators (of unit
mass indexed by k ∈ [0, 1]) and final big players in the market. Final players collect all
the commodities from intermediate speculators and bundle intermediate speculators’
prices into the final price in order to sell the commodity to consumers. In reality,
the price level of many commodities is influenced either through the formation of
cartels by producers or through government intervention by imposing export control
agreements or keeping strategic stock reserves. Although some of those cartels brake
up in the long run, as discussed in Gilbert (1987), all of them have a strong influence
on commodity prices, at least in the short-run. Hence, the introduction of these final
big players who bundle prices tends to generate persistence in commodity prices over
consecutive periods.
For simplicity, we assume that there exists a bundler who bundles all intermediate
speculators’ prices into a single one. Each period t, a fraction 1−γ (0 < 1−γ < 1) of
the speculators is able to exploit their market power and to reset the prices of their
commodities P ∗t (k). In contrast, those who did not benefit from their market power
to affect prices, retain their last period prices: P ∗t (k) = P
∗
t−1(k). Given this staggered
pricing rule, along with the assumptions that speculators are risk neutral and have
rational expectations, intermediate speculators’ current and expected future prices
must satisfy
P ∗t (k) = max
{









The first term in the brackets represents the price if the harvest is sold to consumers
in period t and no inventories are carried over to the next period. The second term
is known as the intertemporal Euler equation. This is the value of one unit stored if
1− γ of the speculators benefit form their market power to affect the price. This, in
turn, occurs if the speculators expect to cover their costs (after depreciation) from
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buying the commodity at time t. Since the current period bundler prices are not yet
determined, it is important to stress that speculators, who do not reset their prices,
use their own current prices and not the market ones in order to determine P ∗t (k) in
(3.1).
Finally, the bundler will bundle all intermediate prices together according to the
following pricing rule (see McCandless (2008))
P 1−ψt = γP
1−ψ
t−1 + (1− γ)P ∗t (k)1−ψ,
where Pt denotes the bundler final price of the good, the parameter ψ is the gross
markup of the intermediate goods speculators and P ∗t (k) represents the price for
intermediate goods speculators who can set their prices. Since all intermediate goods
speculators who can fix their prices are assumed to have the same markup over the
same marginal costs, P ∗t (k) is the same for all intermediate risk neutral speculators
who adjust their prices. Prices for intermediate speculators who cannot set their
prices are the same as the previous period prices denoted by Pt−1.
In order to simplify the bundler’s pricing rule, we use the log-linearized version
of this equation so that the final price becomes
p˜t = γp˜t−1 + (1− γ)p˜∗t (k), (3.2)
where p˜t and p˜
∗
t denote the logarithm of Pt and P
∗
t , respectively.
After completing the description of our model, we elaborate on some important
implications of equation (3.1). As implied by this equation, the intermediate risk
neutral speculators’ price follows a non-linear first-order Markov process with a kink
at the price above which we do not have inventories. In the case of iid shocks, the
kink is determined by









which coincides with the kink given in DL.
However, as in Chambers and Bailey (1996), the price kink pˆ in the case of
correlated harvests shocks is no longer constant and varies with the current harvest.
This is due to the fact that with serially correlated harvest shocks, speculators form
their price forecasts using all the information contained in the current shock.
Under some regularity conditions, most notably r + δ > 0 and that z has a
compact support, DL establish the existence of a solution to (3.1) when γ = 0 and
shocks are independent. Indeed, to show the existence of the demand function for
non-independent shocks, it is enough to prove the independent case conditioning on
time t. In our case, we proceed by following a similar approach to proving that such
an equilibrium exists. Assume that the demand xt always lies in a subset X = [z,+∞)
of the real numbers and that the harvest shock zt belongs to a compact set Z = [z, z¯].
Definition Assume that γ ∈ [0, 1). A staggered stationary rational expectation
equilibrium (SSREE) is a price function f : X× Z→ R which satisfies the following
equation
pt = f(xt, zt) = max
{
p(xt), (1− γ)1− δ
1 + r
Etf(zt+1 + (1− δ)It, zt+1) + γf(xt, zt)
}
where
It = xt − p−1(pt) = xt − p−1(f(xt, zt)). (3.4)
This defines the price function
P ∗t (k) = f(xt, zt),
where f(xt, zt) is the unique, monotone decreasing in its first argument, solution to
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the functional equation. Since this price function is non-linear, numerical techniques
similar to the ones adopted by DL and Michaelides and Ng (2000) are used to solve
for f(xt, zt)
f(xt, zt) = max
{
p(xt), (1− γ)1− δ
1 + r
Etf((zt+1 + (1− δ)It), zt+1) + γf(xt, zt)
}
.
In the case of independent shocks, we can remove the time subscript and the shocks
in f .
When γ = 0 and the shocks are iid, we have the same model as the one considered
by DL. Hence, the equilibrium is simply called SREE. In the following theorem we
show that the staggered stationary rational expectation equilibrium (SSREE) coin-
cides with the stationary rational expectation equilibrium (SREE) derived from the
basic DL speculative storage model.
Theorem 3.1.1 If shocks are iid, then SSREE=SREE.
Proof See Appendix A. 
Remark Theorem 3.1.1 shows that pt = P
∗
t . This allows us to use all of the results
for the process pt, that are available in the literature, for the process P
∗
t .
We next show that the final demand for the bundler in our staggered speculative
model is different form the one in DL. It proves useful to compare the price processes
in the speculative storage model with and without staggered prices for the market
participants who can reset their prices. In the basic speculative storage model of DL,
the market participants cannot hold negative inventories. If prices are expected to
increase or decrease by less than the cost of carrying the commodity from one period
to another, inventories are zero. If inventories are positive, the expected price next
period is equal to the current price plus the storage costs. The final price of the
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Etpt+1 if It > 0;
pt = p(xt) if It = 0.
However, as stated in the description of our speculative storage model with staggered
prices, the intermediate risk neutral speculators price function satisfies
P ∗t = max
{









In this case, 

P ∗t = (1− γ)1−δ1+rEtP ∗t+1 + γP ∗t , if It > 0;
P ∗t = p(xt) if It = 0.
(3.5)
It can be easily seen from (3.5) that the prices for intermediate risk neutral speculators
who can adjust them satisfy the same equation as the one that speculators face in
the basic storage model of DL.
Since the final price process in the speculative storage model with staggered prices
is given by
p˜t = γp˜t−1 + (1− γ)p˜∗t (k), (3.6)
one can infer that the demand of the bundler (the final demand) will be different from
the demand presented by DL in the basic speculative storage model. We expect the
final demand for speculative storage model with staggered prices to be in between
the DL demand and the regular market demand. Moreover, we expect this demand
to be more inelastic than the one derived from the basic speculative storage model.
This is more consistent with the commodity elasticities estimated from actual data.
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3.1.2 Statistical Characterization
Under the assumption of iid harvests shocks, the final log-price process satisfies equa-




The persistence of commodity prices is then simply an outcome of the staggered
prices which is extensively discussed in the literature on staggered pricing. Here, we
provide an alternative explanation. From the logarithmic form of the relation (3.7),
we have by induction that













This shows that Pt+1 shares overlapping terms prices in previous periods which gives
rise to high persistence.
Next, we show that the final prices of the bundler exhibit conditional heteroskedas-
ticity which is another salient characteristic of the observed commodity prices. Note
that from (3.7), we have
Et−1(P
2












Combining (3.8) and (3.9) and assuming that the shocks are iid, the conditional
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f(z + (1− δ)It−1)2(1−γ)
)− (E(f(z + (1− δ)It−1)1−γ)2] .
(3.10)







From (3.10) and (3.11), we can see that the variance is time-varying and, as a result,
the final commodity prices derived from our model exhibit conditional heteroskedas-
ticity. In addition, it is worth noting that the variance also depends on the value of
γ.
It is interesting to point out that the form of the conditional variance in (3.11)
bears strong resemblance to modeling the conditional heteroskedasticity in interest
rate models (see, for instance, Brenner, Harjes, and Kroner (1996)). In these models,
there is a parameter that allows the volatility of interest rates to depend on the level
of the process. Similarly, higher values of the parameter γ in equation (3.11) indicate
that the volatility of commodity prices is more sensitive to their past level which
generates volatility clustering.
3.2 Model Comparisons Using Simulated Data
In this section we examine the statistical properties of the simulated data from our
commodity price model with staggered pricing. In order to assess the qualitative
and quantitative implications of our model, we compare it to the basic speculative
storage model of DL and the modified version of the speculative model of Ng and
Ruge-Murcia (2000). The model of Ng and Ruge-Murcia (2000) extends the DL
model by adding serially correlated harvest shocks that follow an MA(1) process, as
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well as gestation lags, heteroskedastic supply shocks, multi-period forward contracts
and convenience yields.
In our simulations, we calibrate the models using the parameter values estimated
by Deaton and Laroque (1996) for a set of 12 commodities. These parameters (a, b, δ),
presented in Table 3.1, are the same as the parameters used by Ng and Ruge-Murcia
(2000). The data are simulated using iid harvest shocks or MA(1) harvest shocks
with an MA parameter ρ = 0.8. We denote our speculative storage model with
staggered prices by ADG.
Table 3.2 presents the results for the first-order autocorrelation of the simulated
prices from the different models. The first column of Table 3.2 reports the autocorre-
lations from the actual data used in Deaton and Laroque (1996), the second column
shows the results from the basic DL model (ρ = 0) and the third column contains
the results obtained using DL model with MA(1) shocks (ρ = 0.8). The highest
autocorrelation for the simulated prices from the DL model is for Maize (0.413 for
the basic DL model and 0.644 for the specification with MA(1) harvest shocks). For
all other commodities, the serial correlation in the simulated prices is well below the
persistence in the actual prices.
The last two columns of Table 3.2 report the results from our model. For all
commodities, the autocorrelation coefficients of the simulated prices based on the
ADG model are much higher than those of the DL model specifications and are
very close to the autocorrelations obtained from actual data. Once we account for
staggered pricing, the additional effect of serially correlated harvest shocks is minimal.
Furthermore, Table 3.3 lends additional support to our ADGmodel with staggered
prices. In this table, we compare the autocorrelation coefficients for the model by Ng
and Ruge-Murcia (2000) with gestation lags, overlapping contracts and convenience
yields to those computed from our ADG model in columns 4 and 5 of Table 3.2.
Ng and Ruge-Murcia (2000) add gestations lags to the DL basic specification in an
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attempt to reduce the number of periods where the intertemporal price link between
periods with and without production is severed. Consequently, this increases the
serial correlation in prices. For this purpose, Ng and Ruge-Murcia (2000) assume
that there are odd and even periods and that harvest takes place in the even periods.
Hence, the random disturbance term of the harvest process has a variance that could
differ if the period is odd (σ1) or even (σ2). The highest autocorrelations are reached
for a value of σ2
σ1
= 1.8. This model is denoted by GS. The results from the GS
specification are reported in column 2 of Table 3.3.
Ng and Ruge-Murcia (2000) also show, in contrast to the earlier literature on stor-
age where contracts are absent and stockholders are free to roll-over their inventories,
that a model with overlapping contracts can partially explain the high serial corre-
lation in prices. Column 3, denoted by OV in Table 3.3 reports the corresponding
autocorrelation coefficients.
Finally, Ng and Ruge-Murcia (2000) add a convenience yield to the DL model.
Since inventory holders might derive convenience from holding inventories, Ng and
Ruge-Murcia (2000) introduce both a speculative and a convenience motive for in-
ventory holding. Hence, since the convenience yield partially compensates inventory
holders for the expected loss when the basis is below carrying charges, their model
with convenience yield generates a smaller number of stock-outs and, as a result, the
demand for inventories for convenience purposes strengthens the intertemporal link
resulting in a higher persistence of prices. Results for c = 50 are reported in column
4 of Table 3.3. The model is denoted by CY.
Overall, the results in Table 3.3 suggest that the different specifications of Ng and
Ruge-Murcia (2000) cannot generate autocorrelation coefficients greater than 0.640
and they are below the autocorrelation coefficients from our ADG model and the
actual data across all commodities.
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3.3 Empirical Application
This section presents new empirical results from estimating the structural parameters
of our proposed model using monthly data for four agricultural commodities..
3.3.1 Data
The data set employed in this empirical application consists of prices for four agricul-
tural commodities: sugar, soybeans, soybean oil, and wheat. The commodity prices
are obtained from the Commodity Research Bureau and are available at daily fre-
quency for the period March 1983 – July 2008. The trading characteristics of these
commodities are summarized in Table 3.4.
The spot price is approximated by the price of the nearest futures contract.
Monthly commodity price series are constructed from daily data by averaging the
daily prices in the corresponding month. The monthly frequency is convenient for
studying the persistence and conditional heteroskedasticity in commodity prices. The
real commodity prices are obtained by deflating the nominal spot prices by the CPI
(seasonally adjusted) index obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). Each
deflated price series is then further normalized by dividing by the sample average.
By performing this additional normalization, each series has a historical mean of one
which allows us to conduct easier comparisons of the estimated parameters across
various price series.
3.3.2 Estimation Method: Simulated Method of Moments
This section provides a brief description of the simulated method of moments (SMM)
which is used for estimating the model parameters. The main advantage of SMM
lies in its flexibility of the choice of moment conditions that allow us to identify
the staggered pricing parameter γ. See Pakes and Pollard (1989), Lee and Ingram
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(1991) and Duffie and Singleton (1993) for a detailed description of the method and
its asymptotic properties, and Michaelides and Ng (2000) for an investigation of its
finite-sample properties in the context of the speculative storage model.
The SMM estimator requires repeatedly solving the model for given values of
the structural parameters. For this reason, we present some computational details
regarding the solution of the model. The function f(x) is approximated using cu-
bic splines and 100 grid of points for x. This function is calculated using an it-
erative procedure, starting with an initial value f0(x) = max[p(xt), 0]. As in DL,
the interest rate r is not estimated but it is fixed at 5 percent per annum or 0.41
percent (r = 1.05
1
12 − 1 = 0.0041) per month. In addition, we calibrate the depre-
ciation rate δ and set it equal to 0.04 per month. One reason to calibrate δ is that
the SMM estimator tends to over-estimate δ as indicated by Michaelides and Ng
(2000). Finally, the harvest shocks z are discretized using a discrete approximation
of a standard normal random variable with z taking one of the following 10 values:
(±1.755,±1.045,±0.677,±0.386,±0.126), with equal probability of 0.1.
It is worth noting that the prices used for estimation of ADG model parameters
represent the prices of intermediate risk neutral speculators, not the final prices that
are given by the data set described above. Hence, we first retrieve the prices of
intermediate risk neutral speculators from the final prices given by the time series of










Let θ = (a, b, γ)′ denote the vector of structural parameters of the model. Sample
paths of commodity prices can be simulated from the assumed structural model for
a candidate value of θ. In what follows, we simulate one sample path of prices P˜t(θ)
of length TH, where H = 20 and T is the sample size of the observed prices Pt. The
SMM estimator of θ is then obtained by minimizing the weighted distance (using an
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optimal weighting matrix) between the moments of the observed data Pt (empirical
moments) and simulated data P˜t(θ) (theoretical moments). Let m(Pt) and m(P˜t(θ))
denote the set of moments from the observed and simulated data. Then, the SMM
estimator θˆ is defined as
θˆ = ArgminθDT (θ)V
−1
























The vector of moments
m(Pt) = [Pt, (Pt − P¯ )i, (Pt − P¯ )(Pt−1 − P¯ )]′, for i = 2, 3, 4, (3.14)
is chosen to capture the dynamics and the higher-order unconditional moments of





1− 6x2 + 6|x|3 if |x| ≤ 1/2,
2(1− |x|3) if 1/2 ≤ |x| ≤ 1
(3.15)
with four lags.
Under some regularity conditions, Lee and Ingram (1991) and Duffie and Singleton
(1993) show that the SMM estimator is asymptotically normally distributed
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. The derivatives ∂m/∂θ
are computed numerically and ΩH is replaced by a consistent estimator in construct-
ing the standard errors of the parameter estimates.
3.3.3 Empirical Results
The estimation results for the ADG model parameters are presented in Table 3.5.
The standard errors of the estimated parameters, based on the asymptotic approxi-
mation described above, are reported in parentheses below the parameter estimates.
The standard errors for the staggered price parameter γ are low for all of the four
commodities indicating that γ is well identified and significantly different from zero.
The mean of γ for the four commodities is equal to 0.85. The parameter estimates
for b satisfy the constraint b < 0. For most of the cases, the standard errors of the
estimated parameters a and b are relatively low.
In this paper, we argue that the high persistence and the conditional heteroskedas-
ticity in commodity prices appear to be primarily driven by the staggered price pa-
rameter γ. To illustrate this, we simulate 200 price series, each of length of 300
observations. The set of parameters used to conduct the simulations is (a, b, δ) =
(.7,−3, .04) and r = .0041. We compute the first-order autocorrelation for each se-
ries and then calculate the average over the Monte Carlo replications. We repeat the
same exercise for four different values of γ, γ = (0, 0.3, 0.6, 0.9). In the first three
columns of Table 3.7 we report the first-order autocorrelation for the actual data,
ADG and DL models, respectively. Table 3.6 shows that incorporating staggered
prices into the speculative storage model does increase the first-order autocorrelation
of the prices and makes it comparable to the sample autocorrelation of the actual
data. More specifically, as γ increases from γ = 0 (which represents the case for the
DL model) to γ = 0.9, the first-order autocorrelation increases from 0.6 to 0.9.
To visualize the differences between the two models, Figure 3.1 plots the actual
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price of soybean, the simulated prices generated by our ADG model with iid harvest
shocks and estimated parameters (a, b, γ) = (0.352,−4.787, 0.909), and the simulated
prices generated by DL model with estimated parameters (a, b, δ) = (0.723,−0.394, 0.130).
It is clear from the graph that our staggered price model generates more persistent
data with volatility clustering which is closer to the actual price dynamics of soybean
prices presented in Figure 3.1. Also, in Figure 3.2 we trace the dynamic responses
of the simulated commodity prices following a negative harvest shock. The gradual
adjustment of the commodity prices from the ADG model stands in sharp contrast
with the stronger but short-lived impact of the harvest shock on commodity prices
in the DL model.
Next, in order to reveal the advantages of our ADG model in matching the dy-
namics in the first two conditional moments of the data, we simulate 200 series of
prices, each of length of 300 observations, using the parameters estimated from ADG
model (reported in Table 3.5). We repeat the same exercise, using the same values
for the parameters a and b but setting γ = 0, which represents the case for the DL
model. We filter the simulated prices from both the DL and ADG models using an
AR(1) model and then fit a GARCH(1,1) model to each of the pre-filtered series
using the following equations:
Pt = a0 + a1Pt−1 + t
t = σtzt





Figures 3.3 and 3.4 plot the distribution of the parameter estimates βˆ and αˆ for
the ADG and DL models. The figures clearly suggest that the ADG model provides
an improvement over DL model by better capturing the conditional heteroskedastic-
ity. In fact, the medians for βˆ and αˆ, generated by ADG model, are much closer
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to the parameters (denoted by bullets) estimated from actual data. Table 3.7 sum-
marizes the results by reporting the means of the autocorrelations and the GARCH
parameters for the ADG and DL models against the statistics from the actual data.
Overall, the results lend strong support to the staggered pricing feature of the mod-
ified speculative storage model of commodity price determination.
3.4 Conclusion
The main objective of this paper is to propose a model which is able to reproduce
the statistical characteristics of the actual commodity prices. Our modified specula-
tive storage model embeds a staggered price feature into the DL storage model. The
staggered pricing rule is incorporated by introducing intermediate good speculators
and a final goods bundler. We examine the empirical relevance of the structural
modification by comparing our model performance with several models in the litera-
ture, namely DL and the extended DL version of Ng and Ruge-Murcia (2000). Our
analysis suggests that the proposed model outperforms the existing models along
several dimensions such as matching the serial correlation and GARCH dynamics of
the observed commodity prices. We also estimate the vector of structural parameters
for the ADG model with uncorrelated harvest shocks using monthly data for four
agricultural commodity prices. The results tend to suggest that the staggered price
parameter is large and it proves to be instrumental in generating the documented
persistence and conditional heteroskedasticity of commodity prices.
While our paper provides convincing evidence for the importance of integrating
staggered pricing features in modeling the dynamics of commodity prices, it only
serves as an initial step towards better understanding of the source of the gradual
adjustment of commodity prices and the role of market power and government inter-
vention in commodity price determination. Explicitly incorporating institutional ar-
rangements, different risk preferences as well as possible existence of financial hedges
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in some commodity markets might offer a more solid justification for the sluggishness
of commodity prices adopted in this paper. Finally, developing a full structural model
in which staggered pricing is generated endogenously within the model appears to be
a promising direction for future research.
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3.5 Appendix: Proof of Theorem 3.1.1
First, we state the assumptions for the theorem.
Assumptions: Assume that
A.1 r + δ > 0.
A.2 The harvest shocks z belong to a compact set Z = [z, z¯];




Furthermore, we have that z ∈ p−1(p0, p1) and p(z) ∈ R+ \ {0}.
Following Deaton and Laroque (1992), for any function g on the set X = [z,+∞)
we introduce a function G on Y = {(q, x)|x ∈ X , p(x) ≤ q < q1} which has the form
G(q, x) = (1− γ)1− δ
1 + r
Eg(z + (1− δ)(x− p−1(q))) + γq. (3.17)
If γ = 0, then G is the same as in Deaton and Laroque (1992). Let GDL denote the




Eg(z + (1− δ)(x− p−1(q))).
It can be seen that G = (1− γ)GDL + γp.
Theorem 3.1.1 aims to find a function f such that
f(x) = max{G(f(x), x), p(x)}, ∀x ∈ X, (3.18)
where we also have f = g. To prove the theorem, we use the following lemma.
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Lemma 3.5.1 For a given g, the unique solution f : X → R to (3.18) equals fDL,
where fDL is the unique solution to the same problem when γ = 0.
Proof For each x, f(x) is the solution to the following equation for q
max{G(q, x)− q, p(x)− q} = 0. (3.19)
It can be seen that
G(q, x)− q = (1− γ)GDL(q, x) + γq − q = (1− γ)(GDL(q, x)− q).
Thus, the solution q is a solution to
max{(1− γ)(GDL(q, x)− q), p(x)− q} = 0. (3.20)
But this is equivalent to solving3
max{GDL(q, x)− q, p(x)− q} = 0, (3.21)
which gives the desired result. 
This lemma shows that for any g, there is a unique f which is the solution to
(3.18). Therefore, we can introduce an operator T and denote f with Tg.
Proof of Theorem 3.1.1 From Lemma A.1 it follows that T is the same as the op-
erator introduced in Deaton and Laroque (1992). It is shown in Deaton and Laroque
(1992) that T is an operator from the set of non-increasing and continuous functions
on X to itself and has a unique fixed point f , i.e., f = Tf . It then follows that
this unique fixed point is the unique SSREE or SREE. This completes the proof of
Theorem 3.1.1. 




Table 3.1: Parameter estimates from the DL (1996) model.
Commodity a b δ
Cocoa 0.162 -0.221 0.116
Coffee 0.263 -0.158 0.139
Copper 0.545 -0.326 0.069
Cotton 0.642 -0.312 0.169
Jute 0.572 -0.356 0.096
Maize 0.635 -0.636 0.059
Palm oil 0.461 -0.429 0.058
Rice 0.598 -0.336 0.147
Sugar 0.643 -0.626 0.177
Tea 0.479 -0.211 0.123
Tin 0.256 -0.170 0.148
Wheat 0.723 -0.394 0.130
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Table 3.2: Comparing autocorrelations for DL and ADG models based on 5000 ob-
servations.
Commodity Actual DL DL ADG ADG
ρ = 0 ρ = 0.8 ρ = 0 ρ = 0.8
γ = 0 γ = 0 γ = 0.8 γ = 0.8
Cocoa 0.834 0.352 0.609 0.7715 0.8446
Coffee 0.804 0.219 0.576 0.7811 0.8501
Copper 0.838 0.335 0.619 0.8918 0.9074
Cotton 0.884 0.173 0.564 0.8626 0.9053
Jute 0.713 0.289 0.589 0.8817 0.9072
Maize 0.756 0.413 0.644 0.9246 0.9180
Palm oil 0.730 0.397 0.637 0.9079 0.9050
Rice 0.829 0.237 0.579 0.8700 0.9078
Sugar 0.621 0.266 0.583 0.8860 0.9184
Tea 0.778 0.213 0.571 0.8332 0.8893
Tin 0.895 0.238 0.567 0.7547 0.8462
Wheat 0.863 0.250 0.602 0.8834 0.9198
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Table 3.3: Comparing autocorrelations for Ng and Ruge-Murcia and ADG models
based on 5000 observations.
Commodity Actual GL OV CY ADG ADG
ρ = 0 ρ = 0.8
γ = 0.8 γ = 0.8
Cocoa 0.834 0.511 0.462 0.522 0.7715 0.8446
Coffee 0.804 0.433 0.385 0.530 0.7811 0.8501
Copper 0.838 0.526 0.394 0.608 0.8918 0.9074
Cotton 0.884 0.365 0.337 0.473 0.8626 0.9053
Jute 0.713 0.486 0.365 0.545 0.8817 0.9072
Maize 0.756 0.620 0.418 0.623 0.9246 0.9180
Palm oil 0.730 0.640 0.438 0.625 0.9079 0.9050
Rice 0.829 0.398 0.334 0.475 0.8700 0.9078
Sugar 0.621 0.427 0.370 0.424 0.8860 0.9184
Tea 0.778 0.428 0.302 0.509 0.8332 0.8893
Tin 0.895 0.428 0.355 0.472 0.7547 0.8462
Wheat 0.863 0.411 0.368 0.505 0.8834 0.9198
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Table 3.4: Description of commodity prices data.
Description Exchange Contract size Contract month
Foodstuffs
SB : Sugar No.11/World raw NYBOT 112,000 lbs. H,K,N,V
Grains and Oilseeds
S : Soybean/No.1 Yellow CBOT 5,000 bu. F,H,K,N,Q,U,X
BO : Soybean Oil/Crude CBOT 60,000 lb. F,H,K,N,Q,U,V,Z
W : Wheat/No.2 Soft red CBOT 5,000 bu. H,K,N,U,Z
Notes: This table provides a brief description about each commodity. The
first column presents the symbol description and the second one lists the futures
exchange where the commodity is traded. In this table, CBOT refers to Chicago
Board of Trade, NYBOT: New York Board of Trade. The third column states the
contract size and the last column provides the contract months denoted by: F =
January, G = February, H = March, J = April, K = May, M = June, N= July, Q =
August, U = September, V = October, X = November and Z = December.
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Table 3.5: Parameters estimation for ADG model using SMM, with δ = 0.04 and
r = 0.004.
Commodity a b γ
W 0.4227 -4.6606 0.9476
(0.0102) (0.2929) (0.0086)
BO 0.7860 -2.1265 0.7621
(0.0177) (0.1354) (0.0237)
S 0.7209 -2.7562 0.8524
(0.0454) (0.3256) (0.0343)
SB 0.2264 -5.6592 0.9474
(0.0195) (0.4351) (0.0099)
Table 3.6: First order autocorrelations for simulated price series.
γ = 0 γ = 0.3 γ = 0.6 γ = 0.9
Auto. corr. 0.6122 0.7899 0.9172 0.9838
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Table 3.7: First order autocorrelation, β and α parameter for GARCH(1,1) of actual
prices.
Auto. corr. β α
Com. Actual ADG DL Actual ADG DL Actual ADG DL
W 0.9648 0.9899 0.6387 0.6977 0.6719 0.4834 0.2283 0.3006 0.5138
BO 0.9679 0.9550 0.5989 0.7903 0.5160 0.4089 0.1473 0.4709 0.5804
S 0.9697 0.9765 0.6180 0.3413 0.5674 0.4476 0.3410 0.4194 0.5483
SB 0.9620 0.9902 0.6680 0.9018 0.6781 0.4852 0.0798 0.2977 0.5126
84
3.5.2 Figures
Figure 3.1: Actual data of soybean and the Simulated data
From models with staggered pricing and without staggered pricing.
































Figure 3.2: Impulse response function based on simulated data.













Figure 3.3: Distribution of β.
For simulated data from models with and without staggered pricing. The
dash-point indicates the ADG model and the other one is the DL model. Bullet
indicates β for the actual data. Simulation is conducted based on a sample of 300
periods, repeated 200 times.



























Figure 3.4: Distribution of α
For simulated data from models with and without staggered pricing. The
dash-point indicates the ADG model and the other one is the DL model. Bullet
indicates α for the actual data. Simulation is conducted based on a sample of 300
periods, repeated 200 times.
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